Files
otaman/pysim_otaman_server/scp81.py
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catarrh 8c90958718 scp81: PSK by identity, scripts page, exact snapshots, SCP80 LOAD fit (v2.2.0)
Cards / SCP81:
- Cards is a top-level tab; presets gain PSK identity + key, HTTP-OTA
  column, Edit/Update and a live PSK-map push into a running listener.
- SCP81 has Listener/Scripts pills; scripts are named local APDU lists
  (Empty / Explore / Install from .cap / Delete templates), sent to the
  server explicitly at start. The listener takes mode/host/port/script
  only; PSK inputs and the .cap row are gone.
- Multi-PSK TLS listener: identity -> key lookup from the card presets
  (POST /api/scp81/psk-map updates a running listener), unknown
  identities log tls-psk-unknown and fail; handshake logs carry psk_match.
- Script engine: execution tracking (next/done/pending/results), a
  resumed dialog sends only the unexecuted tail (unreported APDU is
  resent), a fresh dialog restarts, listing continuation pages are
  tracked separately (pending.pages/complete). Restart script button.
- POST /api/scp81/gen-install replaces the SCP81 ram-install queueing
  (generation only; the .cap is never stored).

Profiler / snapshots:
- Snapshot comparison is always exact (mask checkboxes removed; the
  first-4-bytes mask remains a profile-creation option).
- "matching records" line shows count + #record numbers.
- New Clone action: copy named "Copy of <profile>", opened in the editor.
- Matched-record count/numbers fix ("1 из 8 (#8)").

SCP80:
- Configurable / auto-fitted LOAD block size: each LOAD APDU encodes into
  one SMS (pySim rejects secured packets above 140 octets, so a 240-byte
  block could never be sent). Response reports the effective size and
  clamps; encode failures are reported per step with the pySim message.

SW cache otaman-v161; docs/api.md, scp81-findings and help EN/RU updated.
Tests: 226 Python + 356 frontend.
2026-09-16 13:32:26 +03:00

451 lines
19 KiB
Python

"""Phase B: PSK TLS server and HTTP administration session for SCP81.
Implements the Remote Administration Server side of GP RAM over HTTP
(GPC v2.2 Amendment B):
- TLS 1.2 with the PSK cipher suites of clause 4.3.2. The handshake and
record layer are handled by the stdlib ``ssl`` module through OpenSSL's
PSK callbacks (identity -> PSK), so no TLS code lives here.
- The HTTP dialog of clause 4.4: parse the Security Domain's POST
(``X-Admin-*`` headers, optional body with the previous response string)
and answer with 200 + a command string, or 204 No Content to close the
administration session.
The card talks TLS *through* the BIP channel: this server listens on the
local redirect target and the BIP terminal proxies the card's SEND/RECEIVE
DATA records to it.
"""
import socket
import ssl
import threading
import time
MAX_HEAD = 32 * 1024
MAX_BODY = 1 * 1024 * 1024
# TLS_PSK_* suites from GPC v2.2 Amendment B Table 4-2 / RFC 4279/4785/5487.
PSK_CIPHERS = ':'.join([
'PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256', # TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x00AE)
'PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA', # TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x008C)
'PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA', # TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x008D)
'PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA', # TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x008B)
'PSK-NULL-SHA256', # TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 (0x00B0)
'PSK-NULL-SHA', # TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA (0x002C)
])
GP_PROTOCOL = 'globalplatform-remote-admin/1.0'
GP_CT_COMMAND = 'application/vnd.globalplatform.card-content-mgt;version=1.0'
GP_CT_RESPONSE = 'application/vnd.globalplatform.card-content-mgt-response;version=1.0'
# OpenSSL SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC (not exposed by the ssl module). The live
# card offers the encrypt_then_mac extension but aborts the session with
# SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE as soon as the server echoes it, so keep the
# extension out of the ServerHello (verified live 2026-09-15).
OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC = 0x00080000
TLS_VERSIONS = {
'1.0': ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1,
'1.1': ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_1,
'1.2': ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2,
}
def _norm_identity(identity):
"""Normalize a PSK identity to the str OpenSSL reports (CPython hands it
to the PSK callback as a str; bytes are decoded byte-exact)."""
if identity is None:
return None
if isinstance(identity, (bytes, bytearray)):
return bytes(identity).decode('latin-1')
return str(identity)
def parse_http_request(data):
"""Parse an HTTP/1.1 request head (bytes up to CRLFCRLF) into
(method, target, headers dict with lower-case names)."""
head = data.split(b'\r\n\r\n', 1)[0]
lines = head.split(b'\r\n')
parts = lines[0].split(b' ')
if len(parts) < 3:
raise ValueError('malformed request line')
method, target = parts[0].decode('latin-1'), parts[1].decode('latin-1')
headers = {}
for line in lines[1:]:
name, _, value = line.partition(b':')
headers[name.strip().decode('latin-1').lower()] = value.strip().decode('latin-1')
return method, target, headers
def decode_chunked(body):
"""Decode a chunked transfer body (RFC 2616 3.6.1)."""
out = bytearray()
while body:
line, _, rest = body.partition(b'\r\n')
try:
size = int(line.split(b';')[0], 16)
except ValueError:
raise ValueError('bad chunk size %r' % line[:16])
if size == 0:
break
out.extend(rest[:size])
body = rest[size + 2:]
return bytes(out)
def build_http_response(status, reason, headers, body=b'', chunked=False,
compact=False, connection=None):
"""Build an HTTP response. With chunked=True the body is framed as 100-byte
chunks (like the reference admin server); with compact=True header names
and values are separated by ':' without whitespace, which keeps the whole
response inside one card-sized TLS record (<= 256 bytes ciphertext).
connection ('close'/'keep-alive') declares the connection fate: without
it an HTTP/1.1 client assumes the connection persists and tries to reuse
it for the next POST instead of dialing a new one (live card 2026-09-15)."""
lines = ['HTTP/1.1 %d %s' % (status, reason)]
sep = ':' if compact else ': '
for name, value in headers.items():
lines.append('%s%s%s' % (name, sep, value))
if connection:
lines.append('Connection%s%s' % (sep, connection))
has_te = 'transfer-encoding' in [k.lower() for k in headers]
if body and (chunked or has_te):
if not has_te:
lines.append('Transfer-Encoding: chunked')
elif body and 'content-length' not in [k.lower() for k in headers]:
lines.append('Content-Length%s%d' % (sep, len(body)))
head = ('\r\n'.join(lines) + '\r\n\r\n').encode('latin-1')
if not body:
return head
if not chunked:
return head + body
out = bytearray(head)
for i in range(0, len(body), 100):
piece = body[i:i + 100]
out += ('%X\r\n' % len(piece)).encode('latin-1') + piece + b'\r\n'
out += b'0\r\n\r\n'
return bytes(out)
class PskTlsServer:
"""PSK TLS listener speaking the GP remote administration HTTP dialog."""
def __init__(self, host, port, psk=None, identity=None, on_log=None,
responder=None, timeout=10.0, chunked=False, chunk_size=0,
keep_alive=False, compact_headers=False, tls_version='1.2',
cipher=None, on_before_close=None, keylog=None,
conn_header=None, half_close=False, answer_delay=0.0,
psk_map=None):
# PSK lookup table: identity -> key. With an explicit psk_map a
# handshake is accepted only for a listed identity; the legacy
# single-key form (psk + optional identity pin, pin None = accept any
# identity) remains for scripts and tests.
self.wildcard_psk = None
self.psk_map = {}
if psk_map is not None:
self.psk_map = {_norm_identity(k): bytes(v)
for k, v in dict(psk_map).items() if v}
elif psk is not None:
pin = _norm_identity(identity)
if pin is None:
self.wildcard_psk = psk
else:
self.psk_map = {pin: bytes(psk)}
self.psk = psk
self.identity = _norm_identity(identity)
self.on_log = on_log
self.responder = responder or self._default_responder
self.timeout = timeout
self.chunked = chunked
# chunk_size 0 = one record for the whole response
self.chunk_size = int(chunk_size)
self.keep_alive = keep_alive
self.compact_headers = compact_headers
# The reference traces negotiated TLS 1.0 with PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA;
# some cards only speak the older record layer correctly.
self.tls_version = tls_version if tls_version in TLS_VERSIONS else '1.2'
# Pin one cipher suite (e.g. PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA) if the card's SD only
# maps a specific suite to a usable SCP81 security level.
self.cipher = cipher or None
# Called with the peer address just before closing a non-keep-alive
# connection: the server waits until the card has drained the BIP
# buffer, otherwise the EOF truncates the response fetch.
self.on_before_close = on_before_close
# Debug aid: write the TLS traffic secrets to this file
# (SSLKEYLOGFILE format), so captures of the PSK dialog can be
# decrypted (tshark etc). Contains key material - use a temp path.
self.keylog = keylog or None
# Connection header value: None = auto ('keep-alive'/'close' per the
# keep_alive flag), 'none' = omit the header (Apache-style implicit
# HTTP/1.1 keep-alive, as in the working reference trace).
self.conn_header = conn_header or None
# TLS half-close after a script body. NOTE (live 2026-09-16):
# CPython's SSLSocket.unwrap() poisons the session when the peer does
# not answer with its own close_notify in time, so this cannot be
# implemented with the stdlib ssl module; the flag is kept for the
# option surface and for cards that answer promptly (the exception
# path leaves the session unusable, so it is off by default).
self.half_close = half_close
# Wait before answering a request (the reference Apache/PHP servers
# answer ~1 s after the card's POST; the card may need its BIP
# SEND-DATA conversation to settle before it accepts the response).
self.answer_delay = float(answer_delay or 0)
self.identity_seen = None
self.identity_matched = None
self.stopped = False
self.conns = []
self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self.sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
# A quick Stop -> Start can race the previous listener's close (the
# port stays busy for a moment); retry before giving up.
last_error = None
for _ in range(10):
try:
self.sock.bind((host, int(port)))
last_error = None
break
except OSError as e:
last_error = e
time.sleep(0.3)
if last_error is not None:
self.sock.close()
raise last_error
self.sock.listen(4)
self.host, self.port = self.sock.getsockname()[:2]
self.ctx = self._make_context()
if self.keylog:
try:
self.ctx.keylog_filename = self.keylog
except (AttributeError, OSError):
self.keylog = None
self.thread = threading.Thread(target=self._accept_loop, daemon=True)
self.thread.start()
self.log('tls-listener-start', host=self.host, port=self.port)
def log(self, kind, **fields):
if self.on_log:
try:
self.on_log(kind, **fields)
except Exception:
pass
def _make_context(self):
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
ver = TLS_VERSIONS[self.tls_version]
ctx.minimum_version = ver
ctx.maximum_version = ver
ciphers = self.cipher or PSK_CIPHERS
if self.tls_version in ('1.0', '1.1'):
# OpenSSL 3.x disables the legacy protocol versions by default.
ciphers += ':@SECLEVEL=0'
ctx.set_ciphers(ciphers)
# Prefer our (AES-first) order over the card's NULL-suite-first list.
ctx.options |= ssl.OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
ctx.options |= OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
# No TLS session resumption: the live card aborts with
# SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on the post-handshake
# NewSessionTicket record (verified live 2026-09-15).
ctx.options |= ssl.OP_NO_TICKET
ctx.set_psk_server_callback(self._psk_cb)
return ctx
def _psk_cb(self, identity):
"""OpenSSL asks for the key of the identity the client sent.
The identity is looked up in the configured table (identity -> key);
without a match the handshake fails on the Finished MAC check with a
dummy key, and the attempt is logged as 'tls-psk-unknown'."""
ident = _norm_identity(identity)
self.identity_seen = ident
key = self.psk_map.get(ident) if ident is not None else None
if key is None:
# Legacy single-key mode: no identity pin accepts any identity.
key = self.wildcard_psk
self.identity_matched = key is not None
if key is None:
self.log('tls-psk-unknown', identity=ident)
return b'\x00' * 16
return key
@property
def psk_identities(self):
"""Identities the listener looks up (keys are never exposed)."""
return sorted(self.psk_map)
def set_psk_map(self, psk_map):
"""Replace the identity -> key table of a running listener."""
self.psk_map = {_norm_identity(k): bytes(v)
for k, v in dict(psk_map).items() if v}
self.wildcard_psk = None
return self.psk_identities
@staticmethod
def _default_responder(method, target, headers, body):
"""No script configured: close the administration session (4.4.2)."""
return 204, {'X-Admin-Protocol': GP_PROTOCOL}, b''
def _accept_loop(self):
while not self.stopped:
try:
self.sock.settimeout(0.2)
conn, addr = self.sock.accept()
except socket.timeout:
continue
except OSError:
break
self.conns.append(conn)
peer = '%s:%d' % addr[:2]
threading.Thread(target=self._conn_loop, args=(conn, peer),
daemon=True).start()
def _read_request(self, tls):
buf = b''
while b'\r\n\r\n' not in buf:
chunk = tls.recv(4096)
if not chunk:
return None
buf += chunk
if len(buf) > MAX_HEAD:
raise ValueError('request head too large')
head, _, rest = buf.partition(b'\r\n\r\n')
method, target, headers = parse_http_request(head + b'\r\n\r\n')
body = rest
if 'content-length' in headers:
want = int(headers['content-length'])
while len(body) < want:
chunk = tls.recv(4096)
if not chunk:
break
body += chunk
body = body[:want]
elif headers.get('transfer-encoding', '').lower() == 'chunked':
while not body.endswith(b'0\r\n\r\n'):
chunk = tls.recv(4096)
if not chunk:
break
body += chunk
body = decode_chunked(body)
return method, target, headers, body
def _conn_loop(self, conn, peer):
tls = None
try:
tls = self.ctx.wrap_socket(conn, server_side=True)
self.log('tls-handshake', peer=peer, cipher=tls.cipher()[0],
version=tls.version(), identity=self.identity_seen,
psk_match=self.identity_matched)
while not self.stopped:
req = self._read_request(tls)
if req is None:
break
method, target, headers, body = req
if self.answer_delay > 0:
time.sleep(self.answer_delay)
self.log('tls-request', peer=peer, method=method, uri=target,
headers=headers,
agent=headers.get('x-admin-from'),
protocol=headers.get('x-admin-protocol'),
script_status=headers.get('x-admin-script-status'),
resume=headers.get('x-admin-resume'),
content_type=headers.get('content-type'),
bytes=len(body), body_hex=body.hex().upper()[:2000] or None)
status, resp_headers, resp_body = self.responder(
method, target, headers, body)
reason = {200: 'OK', 204: 'No Content'}.get(status, 'Status')
conn_hdr = self.conn_header
if conn_hdr == 'none':
conn_hdr = None
elif conn_hdr is None:
conn_hdr = 'keep-alive' if self.keep_alive else 'close'
response = build_http_response(
status, reason, resp_headers, resp_body,
chunked=self.chunked, compact=self.compact_headers,
connection=conn_hdr)
# The card's HTTP client reads its response record-by-record:
# the whole response must arrive in ONE TLS record (chunk_size
# 0), otherwise a split head stalls it and a head-only record
# followed by the body draws an unexpected_message alert. When
# a chunk_size is given, the head goes in one record and the
# body in pieces of that size.
if self.chunk_size <= 0:
tls.sendall(response)
else:
head, sep, rest = response.partition(b'\r\n\r\n')
tls.sendall(head + sep if sep else head)
for off in range(0, len(rest), self.chunk_size):
tls.sendall(rest[off:off + self.chunk_size])
self.log('tls-response', peer=peer, status=status,
bytes=len(resp_body), chunked=self.chunked,
response_hex=response.hex().upper()[:600],
body_hex=resp_body.hex().upper()[:2000] or None)
# 204 always ends the dialog. Without keep-alive every response
# ends it: the card's HTTP client appears to delimit the
# response at connection close (live 2026-09-15) and then
# starts a fresh session for its next POST.
if status == 204 or not resp_body or not self.keep_alive:
peer_name = None
if resp_body and self.on_before_close:
try:
peer_name = tls.getpeername()
except Exception:
peer_name = None
plain = None
if not self.keep_alive:
# Clean TLS shutdown BEFORE the card drains the
# buffer: a bare TCP close leaves the card's TLS stack
# with a truncated session (it then neither processes
# the script nor posts the response), and a
# close_notify sent only after the drain is never
# fetched. Send it while the response still waits, so
# the card reads both, then wait for the buffer to
# drain and only then send the FIN.
try:
tls.settimeout(2.0)
plain = tls.unwrap()
tls = None
except Exception:
plain = None
if peer_name and self.on_before_close:
try:
self.on_before_close(peer_name)
except Exception:
pass
if plain is not None:
try:
plain.close()
except OSError:
pass
break
except ssl.SSLError as e:
self.log('tls-error', peer=peer, error=str(e))
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
self.log('tls-error', peer=peer, error=str(e))
finally:
if tls is not None:
try:
tls.close()
except OSError:
pass
else:
try:
conn.close()
except OSError:
pass
self.log('tls-close', peer=peer)
if conn in self.conns:
self.conns.remove(conn)
def stop(self):
self.stopped = True
self.log('tls-listener-stop', host=self.host, port=self.port)
try:
self.sock.close()
except OSError:
pass
for conn in list(self.conns):
try:
conn.close()
except OSError:
pass
self.conns = []