fix: keep a hand-edited packet TAR in the SCP80 send (v3.6.21)
The plain "Send to Card" path refreshed the whole preset right before sending (spRefreshFromPreset -> cardsApply -> cardsApplyFields) and re-applied the preset's slot TAR - so a TAR typed for a push/link trigger, an applet OTA message or the HTTP OTA admin params was silently replaced by the preset's ISD TAR (the pack buttons for those sources deliberately leave the TAR manual; the help even said so). - spRefreshFromPreset(selId, keepTar): the plain send passes keepTar, so the form's TAR survives; the counter, keys and SPI are still re-read. - selecting a card preset, ramApplyCard and the chain packs still set the TAR; the RAM operations keep the preset's ISD TAR by design. - spParams()/getRamSpParams() normalise the TAR (strip/upper/pad to 6); only the preview padded before, a short TAR went to the server raw. - help EN/RU clarified, cards_counter/ram tests updated, sw simple-v294. 652 frontend / 499 Python green; version 3.6.21.
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<p class="text-sm mb-2"><strong>Pack into Secured packet</strong> sends the built payload to the SCP80 tab for SPI/counter filling — insert the TAR the SD listens on (typically the OTASD TAR) there.</p>
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<h4 id="push-ts102226" class="font-medium mb-1 mt-3">TS 102 226 §9 PUSH</h4>
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<p class="text-sm mb-2">The <strong>Channel / link trigger</strong> sub-pill builds the §9 requests with the same encoder as the RAM/GP chain's <strong>PUSH</strong> row, previews the C-APDU(s), and offers <strong>Pack into Secured packet</strong> (the TAR stays manual: the request is addressed to the target application, not the Security Domain) and <strong>→ Expanded Script</strong> (wraps each APDU in the <code class="font-mono text-sm">22</code> Command TLV and appends them to the Expanded Script builder).</p>
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<p class="text-sm mb-2">The <strong>Channel / link trigger</strong> sub-pill builds the §9 requests with the same encoder as the RAM/GP chain's <strong>PUSH</strong> row, previews the C-APDU(s), and offers <strong>Pack into Secured packet</strong> (the TAR stays manual: the request is addressed to the target application, not the Security Domain, and a typed TAR is kept when sending) and <strong>→ Expanded Script</strong> (wraps each APDU in the <code class="font-mono text-sm">22</code> Command TLV and appends them to the Expanded Script builder).</p>
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<ul class="list-disc list-inside text-sm space-y-1 mb-3">
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<li><strong>BIP channel opening</strong> (<code class="font-mono text-sm">01</code>) — built in <strong>Fields</strong> mode from the most-used OPEN CHANNEL parameters (Stepping Stones §18.6.1): bearer description, transport protocol (UDP or TCP, UICC client, remote — the only values the command allows) with the destination port, destination address, NAA/APN, buffer size and alpha (a <em>transparent</em> checkbox sends the null alpha, i.e. no user confirmation); login/password and anything else go in the extra-TLVs field. The <strong>local address is never emitted</strong> (§9.2.1 and the guide both forbid it). <strong>Hex</strong> mode takes the raw COMPREHENSION-TLVs instead. The application issues the proactive OPEN CHANNEL itself (§9.1.1). SIMalliance Stepping Stones R7 §18.6 recommends sending it <strong>together with the CAT_TP request in the same message</strong> (the channel parameters ride in <code class="font-mono text-sm">01</code>, the CAT_TP port in <code class="font-mono text-sm">02</code>), so the form has an <em>Also request the CAT_TP link establishment (02)</em> checkbox; the pair is one concatenated command script (concatenated SMS when it exceeds 140 octets).</li>
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<li><strong>CAT_TP link establishment</strong> (<code class="font-mono text-sm">02</code>) — destination port in transport level <code class="font-mono text-sm">3C</code> with protocol type 00 (mandatory), optional buffer size <code class="font-mono text-sm">39</code> / identification data <code class="font-mono text-sm">36</code>. Standalone it relies on card-provisioned channel/CAT_TP defaults, which the Stepping Stones guide advises against; prefer the pair above.</li>
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<tr><td class="py-1 px-2">PSK key</td><td class="py-1 px-2">SCP81 HTTP OTA: 32 hex chars (16 bytes) for the PSK TLS listener, picked by the identity the card presents</td></tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<p class="text-sm mb-3">The <strong>SCP81</strong> column shows whether the preset supplies a usable PSK pair: <strong>✓</strong> (green) — identity and key set; <strong>⚠</strong> (amber) — only one of the two, so the listener ignores the preset; <strong>—</strong> — no PSK. PSK identity and key must be set together. <strong>Edit</strong> loads a preset into the form (the Add button becomes <strong>Save</strong>; <strong>Cancel</strong> clears it) so fields can be changed without re-entering the card; <strong>Remove</strong> deletes the row. Presets can be shared with <strong>Export to file</strong> and restored with <strong>Import from file</strong>. The selected card preset auto-fills the Secured Packet form and sets the TAR for the operation (RAM/GP → ISD TAR, SIM RFM → UICC RFM TAR, USIM RFM → ADF RFM TAR); edits are pushed into a running SCP81 listener automatically.</p>
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<p class="text-sm mb-3">The <strong>SCP81</strong> column shows whether the preset supplies a usable PSK pair: <strong>✓</strong> (green) — identity and key set; <strong>⚠</strong> (amber) — only one of the two, so the listener ignores the preset; <strong>—</strong> — no PSK. PSK identity and key must be set together. <strong>Edit</strong> loads a preset into the form (the Add button becomes <strong>Save</strong>; <strong>Cancel</strong> clears it) so fields can be changed without re-entering the card; <strong>Remove</strong> deletes the row. Presets can be shared with <strong>Export to file</strong> and restored with <strong>Import from file</strong>. The selected card preset auto-fills the Secured Packet form and sets the TAR for the operation (RAM/GP → ISD TAR, SIM RFM → UICC RFM TAR, USIM RFM → ADF RFM TAR); a TAR typed into the Secured Packet form by hand is kept when sending - the counter, keys and SPI are still re-read from the preset; edits are pushed into a running SCP81 listener automatically.</p>
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</section>
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<section class="mb-10">
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