Files

T

catarrh 0e06b918a7 docs: a scripted RFM SELECT should use P2=0C (guide note)

The alfa-dsa RFM script work showed a card refusing the P2='00' (FCI) form
of a SELECT inside a secured command script with 6A86, while P2='0C' (no
response data) executes - and a script has nowhere to put an FCI anyway.
Worksheet 1 gains the note (TS 102 226 7.2: the RFM application starts in
MF); the repo AGENTS records the observation.  Docs only - no code, no
version or sw change.

2026-10-05 00:14:32 +03:00

25 KiB

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Test script authoring guide

A test script is a JSON document that drives a deterministic dialogue with the card over the local server: ordered actions (each sends something and checks the response) and expectations (each fetches the proactive command the card announced, checks it, and sends the scripted TERMINAL RESPONSE).

Scripts live in the server-side store (~/.pysim-simple-server/test_scripts.json, --test-scripts): the PWA's Test script pill manages them (Import/Export move JSON in and out, the old localStorage export imports as-is), and any API client can create or run them (POST /api/test/run with an inline script or a stored script_id - see docs/api.md). While a run is active the card belongs to the script.

Format: server ≥ 3.15.0 (kvn, por and files checks), scripts stored server-side since 3.16.0, menu-select by text and the spec-order TERMINAL RESPONSE codings since 3.17.0, the semantic event action since 3.18.0, the envelope action's src override since 3.18.1, the inline por object, the alpha/sms checks, scp80.params.format and the case-insensitive menu-select text match since 3.19.0.

Writing a test for an applet

Collect these values before writing the JSON (from the applet's source/spec and the card's preset):

What	Where it goes	Notes
TAR to address (the RFM application or the applet's own) + MSL, or an explicit SPI1	`scp80.params.tar` / `spi1`	the card preset must carry the TAR with its MSL, or the step passes `spi1`; RFM TARs: `B00000`/`B00001`/`B00010` compact, `B00120`/`B00140`/`B00130` expanded (see Worksheet 1)
Keyset number	`scp80.params.kvn` (1–15)	only when the applet's keys are not the preset's first keyset
Trigger C-APDUs (+ their format)	`scp80.params.apdu` / `format`	one secured packet per `scp80` step; the preset provides keys and counter, `format` wraps the APDU for an expanded-format application
Expected file paths + contents	`file-read.params.path` + `check.data`	a mask must have exactly the actual value's length
Expected proactive command(s)	`expect.command` + `qualifier`/`checks`	REFRESH `qualifier: "00"` = NAA init + full FCN, `files` asserts the changed EFs
PoR transport + expected PoR	`scp80.check.por`/`check.data` (inline) or `expect SEND SHORT MESSAGE` + `por` check	pick per the SPI2 the applet expects
Delivery timing	a `status` action when the card delivers on poll	the runner never polls by itself

The three status words (envelope SW · PoR status · R-APDU SW)

An SCP80 step carries three different "SW" values; keep them apart when writing checks:

Where it comes from	What it means	Script field	Report row
the ENVELOPE exchange	the card's answer to the command that was sent (`9000` executed, `91XX` a proactive command is pending, `62XX`/`63XX` a warning)	the action's `check.sw`	`SW`
the PoR status	the SCP80 security-processing verdict inside the response packet (`por_ok`, `cntr_low`, `rc_cc_ds_failed`, `tar_unknown`, …)	`por.status` (or `"por": "ok"`)	`PoR status`
the R-APDU SW	the response payload's own status word - the last executed command's / GET RESPONSE's status in the compact form (TS 102 226 §5.1.2 Table 5.1), or the last R-APDU's in the scripting (`AB`/`AF`) form	`por.sw`	`PoR SW`

por.sw is a child of the response payload, not of the envelope: it exists only when the addressed TAR is a remote-management application (ISD / RFM). A third-party applet's own TAR answers with application-defined bytes - the platform passes them through unchanged - so there is no R-APDU SW to check: por.sw reports (none) and the whole secured data is exposed as por.data. Assert such a response with data and leave sw empty; the step's check.sw still asserts the envelope exchange.

A 62XX/63XX envelope answer does not guarantee a response packet: an application that refuses at the envelope level (e.g. an applet answering 6200 to an unknown command) sends none, while other warning paths still deliver one (the low-counter case arrives via SEND SHORT MESSAGE). For a step expected to be refused, leave por at its "any" default or assert "por": "none"; the run report's PoR[…] log line and por field show which happened.

Worksheet 1 - RFM update → file change → REFRESH (full FCN)

{"name": "applet RFM update",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "scp80",
   "params": {"apdu": "<RFM C-APDU>", "tar": "B00001", "kvn": 1, "spi2": "01"},
   "check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"}, "por": "none"},
   "label": "RFM update"},
  {"type": "expect", "command": "REFRESH", "qualifier": "00",
   "checks": [{"kind": "files", "value": "<changed FIDs, e.g. 3F007F206F07>"}],
   "respond": {"result": "ok"}},
  {"type": "action", "kind": "file-read", "params": {"path": "<EF path>"},
   "check": {"data": {"mode": "mask", "value": "<expected bytes, ? = wildcard>"}}}
 ]}

tar addresses the RFM application that owns the file system, not the applet-under-test: B00000 = UICC shared FS, B00001 = ADF RFM, B00010 = SIM FS (compact), and B00120/B00140/B00130 the expanded-format twins (TS 101 220 Annex D; the probe list in the SCP80 tab carries the same names). An applet that accepts secured packets under its own TAR - the TAR given in its INSTALL [for install] parameters (TS 102 226 §8.2.1.3.2.7) - uses that TAR instead. The preset must carry a TAR entry with its MSL or the step passes an explicit spi1; an expanded-format RFM application also expects the wrapped command template ("format": "expanded"/"expanded-ae", see the actions table).

A scripted SELECT inside the secured packet should ask for no response data (P2='0C', e.g. 00A4000C02A153): a card can refuse the P2='00' form (return the FCI) with 6A86 when it arrives inside a command script, and the script has nowhere to put an FCI anyway. The RFM application starts in MF (TS 102 226 §7.2), so the selects walk from there.

Worksheet 2 - incoming data → particular PoR, no other actions

Inline PoR:

{"name": "applet data (inline PoR)",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "scp80",
   "params": {"apdu": "<data C-APDU>", "tar": "<applet TAR>", "spi2": "01"},
   "check": {"sw": "9000", "por": "ok",
             "data": {"mode": "mask", "value": "<expected PoR bytes>"}}}
 ]}

PoR-in-submit:

{"name": "applet data (SEND SM PoR)",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "scp80",
   "params": {"apdu": "<data C-APDU>", "tar": "<applet TAR>", "spi2": "21"},
   "check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"}, "por": "none"}},
  {"type": "expect", "command": "SEND SHORT MESSAGE",
   "checks": [{"kind": "por", "status": "por_ok", "sw": "<R-APDU SW>",
               "data": {"mode": "mask", "value": "<expected response data>"}}],
   "respond": {"result": "ok"}}
 ]}

Validation checklist

Client-side: the PWA import (or testScriptProblem) rejects structural mistakes; the server validates again with the same engine at run start.
Import the JSON (PWA → Simulator → Test script → Import, or POST /api/test/scripts), select the matched preset, Run.
Read the report: every action/expectation shows expected vs actual per check; ⚠ = warning (continues), ✗ = error (stops). A failed step names the reason (note).
Iterate: a mismatch on data usually means the mask length differs from the actual value, or the value changed between runs - mask the varying bytes (counter, date-time) with ?.
Counters: the run starts from the preset's stored counter and advances it after every scp80 step the card answers (when SPI1 requests a counter check); a refused packet moves it forward too - see the presets section.

Reading the run log

Every step writes a semantic line to the server log under its step number, request before response:

TEST-RUN step 1: SCP80 C-APDU=80E2900000
TEST-RUN step 1: SCP80 SECURED=0100…1A2B (N B) TAR=B00001 SPI1=16 SPI2=21 CNTR=0000000A
TEST-RUN step 1: SCP80 -> SW=9000
TEST-RUN step 1: PoR[inline] status=por_ok TAR=B00001 CNTR=0000000A raw=0271…aabb
TEST-RUN step 1: R-APDU SW=9000 data=AABB
TEST-RUN step 2: STATUS 1/2 -> 9102
TEST-RUN step 3: FETCH=8012000002 -> SW=9000 D03C8103012500…
TEST-RUN step 3: CMD 0x25 SET UP MENU qual=00
TEST-RUN step 3: TR=81030125008202828183020000 -> SW=9000
TEST-RUN step 4: MENU-SELECT ENVELOPE=80c2000009d30702020181900101 item=1 ('One') -> SW=9103

A PoR delivered as SEND SHORT MESSAGE is logged on the step that fetches it: PoR[sms-submit] … followed by the same R-APDU line.
A SEND SHORT MESSAGE expectation also logs its parsed TPDU (SMS DA=… PID=… DCS=… UDL=… UD=…) after the CMD line, so an applet's own SMS can be read even without an sms check.
A wrapped scp80 step logs both forms: SCP80 C-APDU=<plain> WRAPPED=<wrapped> (<format>); a pre-built packet logs SCP80 SP=….
Other actions log their send/response pair too (APDU TX=… -> SW=…, ENVELOPE(Event Download) … -> SW=…, READ BINARY <path>, READ RECORD <n> <path>, UPDATE BINARY <path>, each with -> SW=…).
A failing step adds TEST-RUN step N failed: … with the reason.
The shared secured-packet sender logs each segment's answer (OTA SEND: ENVELOPE i/N -> <SW>).
--apdu-trace adds the raw transport view (APDU-TRACE(…): <cmd> → SW: … RESP: …) for every APDU, including the file-manager reads and pySim's auto-handler traffic.

Document shape

{"name": "applet RFM update",
 "steps": [
   {"type": "action", "kind": "scp80", "params": {…}, "check": {…}, "label": "optional"},
   {"type": "expect", "command": "REFRESH", "qualifier": "00",
    "checks": [{"kind": "files", "value": "3F007F206F07"}],
    "respond": {"result": "ok"}}
 ]}

Every step may carry on_fail: "error" (default - stops the run) or "warning" (continues, the report shows ⚠). Each entry of checks may override it with its own on_fail.

Presets: where the keys, TARs and counters come from

An SCP80 action never carries key material. The PWA sends the stored preset's id with the run; the server resolves it and takes:

the keyset - the step's kvn (1–15) or the preset's first keyset,
the keys and the counter of that keyset,
the TAR table with each TAR's MSL (Minimum SPI1).

So before a run the matched preset (ICCID) must contain the keyset and, for every TAR the script addresses, either a TAR entry with its MSL or an explicit spi1 in the step. A step that omits them gets the preset's ISD role TAR as tar, that TAR's MSL as spi1 and 01 as spi2; kvn defaults to the first keyset.

Counter handling: the run starts from the keyset's stored counter and advances (and persists) its next value after every scp80 step the card answers, when the packet requests a counter check (SPI1 b5b4 ≠ 00, TS 102 225 §5.1.1) - a refused packet moves the local value forward too. The local counter therefore only ever moves up, so a later packet is never below what the card has seen; consecutive runs continue correctly.

Actions

{"type": "action", "kind": "…", "params": {…}, "check": {…}}

kind	params	notes
`envelope`	`event` 0–255, `data` hex (optional), optional `src`	ENVELOPE(Event Download) with raw data; `src` overrides the device-identities source (`82` terminal / `83` network)
`event`	`event` (name or hex), `fields` (object), optional `src`	semantic ENVELOPE(Event Download) for 0x03/0x0B/0x12/0x1D (see below)
`menu-select`	`item_id` 1–255 or `text` + `mode` `exact`/`contains` (+ `case_sensitive: true` for an exact-case match — the default is case-insensitive; the step editor's Match case choice writes it), not both	ENVELOPE(Menu Selection); the text is resolved against the card's cached menu - refreshed whenever the card sends SET UP MENU, so it follows the applet's install parameters
`file-write`	`path`, `data`, `mode` `auto`/`binary`/`record`, `record` 1–255	UPDATE BINARY/RECORD
`file-read`	`path`, `mode`, `record`	READ BINARY/RECORD; verify with `check.data`
`apdu`	`apdu` hex	raw transport, no auto-handler
`scp80`	`apdu` xor `sp` (optional `source`), `kvn`, `tar`, `spi1`, `spi2`, `format`	secured packet to the TAR; `format`: `compact` (default - the C-APDU verbatim), `expanded` (the `AA`-prefixed Command Scripting template) or `expanded-ae` (the `AE 80 … 00 00` form), TS 102 226 §5.2.1
`status`	`attempts` 1–1000, `interval_ms` 0–10000	with `attempts > 1` the default SW check is `91??` (poll until a command)

path is /-separated: MF (or 3F00) or an ADF name/AID first, then FIDs or file names - e.g. MF/7F20/6F07, ADF.USIM/EF.TEST.

file-write sends a direct terminal-side UPDATE BINARY/RECORD - it does not fire the card's EVENT_REMOTE_FILE_UPDATE (that event reports an update done by a remote entity through OTA/RFM, TS 102 223 §7.5.9): assert the change with file-read or the REFRESH files check.

Semantic events (`kind: "event"`)

The server builds the event objects for the events a test needs most; an event without a builder goes through the raw envelope action, whose data hex the Phone tab's event form shows (Event data (hex), copyable). Both actions take the same optional src device-identities override.

{"type": "action", "kind": "event",
 "params": {"event": "location_status",
            "fields": {"status": 0, "mcc": "250", "mnc": "01",
                       "lac": "00FF", "cell": "0001"}}}

`event`	fields
`location_status` / `0x03`	`status` 0 normal / 1 limited / 2 no service; for normal service `mcc`, `mnc`, `lac`, `cell`
`access_tech` / `0x0B`	`tech` (TS 102 223 8.61 coding: 0 GSM, 3 UTRAN, 8 E-UTRAN, 10 NG-RAN, …)
`network_rejection` / `0x12`	`reg_type` 0–17, `access_tech`, `cause`; the location object follows the registration group - LU: `lac`, GPRS: `lac`+`rac`, EPS/5GS: `tac` (4–6 hex) + optional `ext_cause`; `mcc`/`mnc`; optional `ext_info_type` (1 CAG ID / 2 NID / 3 RedCap) + `ext_info`
`data_connection` / `0x1D`	`status` 0–2, `type` 0–2, optional `cause`, `ti` (hex byte), `datetime: "now"` (host clock, 8.39), `mcc`/`mnc`/`lac`/`cell`, `tech`, `loc_status`, `apn`, `pdp_type`

src overrides the device-identities source (82 terminal, 83 network); the default is the terminal, matching the Phone tab's forms.

`check` on actions

"check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"},
          "data": {"mode": "exact", "value": "0271…"},
          "por": "ok"}

sw - default {"mode": "exact", "value": "9000"} (a status action with attempts > 1 defaults to the 91?? mask).
data - the response data (for SCP80: the inline PoR packet).
por (SCP80 actions only) - "any" (default, no check), "ok" (response_status == por_ok), "none" (no PoR expected), or an object {"status"?, "sw"?, "data"?} asserting the decoded PoR of this very exchange (at least one field; the same fields as the expectation's por check, status accepting ok for por_ok) - it works for both the inline and the SEND SHORT MESSAGE transport. Example: "por": {"status": "por_ok", "sw": "9000"}.
A plain hex string is exact; a value containing ? is a mask. A mask must have exactly the same length as the actual value (? is a per-nibble wildcard) - e.g. 91?? matches 9102, 027100???? matches a 4-byte prefix.

Expectations

{"type": "expect", "command": "SEND SHORT MESSAGE",
 "qualifier": "00",
 "checks": [{"kind": "por", "status": "por_ok", "sw": "9000"}],
 "respond": {"result": "ok"}}

The card must have announced a command (91XX) in the previous step - the runner never polls by itself. command is a name (as shown in the proactive log) or a hex type; ANY/* skips the type check. qualifier is the command-details byte 3 (one byte, exact/mask).

Content checks

kind	fields	checks
`text`	`mode` contains/exact, `value`, `case_sensitive`	the Text string (`8D`, DCS coded) of DISPLAY TEXT / GET INKEY / GET INPUT
`alpha`	`mode` contains/exact, `value`, `case_sensitive`	the command's Alpha identifier (tag `05`/`85`, TS 102 223 §8.2, Annex A coded) - distinct from `text` when a command carries both
`item`	`id`, `text`, `mode`, `case_sensitive`	items of SELECT ITEM / SET UP MENU
`raw`	`mode` exact/mask, `value`	the whole fetched command (hex, exact length needed)
`por`	`status`, `sw`, `data`	the PoR carried by a SEND SHORT MESSAGE (see below)
`sms`	`da`, `pid`, `dcs`, `udl`, `ud`	the TPDU of a SEND SHORT MESSAGE (see below)
`files`	`files` (list of path hex strings) or a comma/space separated string	the File List of a REFRESH, TS 102 223 §8.18; matched order-insensitively

por needs an SCP80 step before the expectation: the TPDU of the SEND SHORT MESSAGE is decoded with that step's keyset, SPI and counter. status is the decoded response status name (por_ok, cntr_low, rc_cc_ds_failed, …; ok is accepted for por_ok); sw is the R-APDU status word inside the response payload - not the envelope's, see The three status words in the authoring section - and data the R-APDU response data (exact/mask); both come from the decoded response (scripting AB/AF/compact forms). An applet's own TAR answers with its application-defined bytes: when the data cannot be the compact remote response (its command count exceeds the command script that was sent), the whole secured data is reported as data and no sw is decoded - assert such a response with data (the action's por object follows the same rule). A PoR split over several SMS parts is accumulated across SEND SHORT MESSAGE expectations: put the por check on the step that completes the sequence (intermediate steps should use raw or no PoR check).

sms parses the fetched SEND SHORT MESSAGE's TPDU (SMS-SUBMIT only - any other MTI fails the check): da the destination digits as the TPDU carries them (exact; whitespace and a leading + in the script are ignored - the international flag lives in the TPDU's type-of-number), pid/dcs single bytes and ud the raw user data (a UDH included) as hex exact/mask, udl the user-data length in decimal (octets, or septets for the 7-bit alphabet - whatever the TPDU carries). Use it for an applet's own SMS; the OTA PoR of the preceding scp80 step is what por decodes. At least one field is required.

`respond`

Optional - an omitted (or empty) object answers ok (0x00). The TERMINAL RESPONSE follows the TS 102 223 §6.8.0 object order (Command details, Device identities, Result, Duration, Text string, Item identifier, …):

result - name or hex (ok, partial, missing, refused, not_understood, modified, cancel, back, timeout, no_response).
text + dcs - the Text string for a GET INKEY / GET INPUT answer. dcs uses the spec's recommended codings: "00" GSM default alphabet 7 bits packed, "04" GSM default alphabet 8 bits (one octet per character), "08" UCS2 (UTF-16-BE). An empty text sends the null text string (Length 00).
item_id - the Item identifier for a successful SELECT ITEM answer.
raw - extra COMPREHENSION-TLVs appended after the standard objects.

UCS2 answer to a GET INPUT:

{"type": "expect", "command": "GET INPUT",
 "respond": {"result": "ok", "text": "Пароль", "dcs": "08"}}

The two PoR transports (SPI2)

Inline - the card answers the ENVELOPE 9000 with the PoR in the response data. Verify on the action: "por": "ok" and/or "data": {"mode": "mask", "value": "…"}, or assert the decoded PoR with "por": {"status": "por_ok", "sw": "9000"}.
PoR-in-submit (SPI2 bit 20, e.g. spi2: "21") - the card announces a SEND SHORT MESSAGE (91XX); the PoR is inside its SMS TPDU:

{"type": "action", "kind": "scp80",
 "params": {"apdu": "…", "tar": "B00001", "spi2": "21"},
 "check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"}, "por": "none"}},
{"type": "expect", "command": "SEND SHORT MESSAGE",
 "checks": [{"kind": "por", "status": "por_ok", "sw": "9000"}],
 "respond": {"result": "ok"}}

If the card announces the SEND SHORT MESSAGE only on a later STATUS poll, insert a status action (attempts > 1) before the expectation.

"No actions" after a trigger

An exact SW check is the assertion: "check": {"sw": "9000"} fails if the card answers 91XX (a command was announced); the runner also errors on a pending command the next step does not expect.

Worked examples

Event download before an applet action

{"name": "applet event",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "event",
   "params": {"event": "location_status",
              "fields": {"status": 0, "mcc": "250", "mnc": "01",
                         "lac": "00FF", "cell": "0001"}},
   "check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"}}},
  {"type": "expect", "command": "ANY", "respond": {"result": "ok"}}
 ]}

The event's default SW check is an exact 9000; a mask (91??) is needed when the applet answers with a proactive command, which the next expectation then fetches.

{"name": "applet menu",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "menu-select",
   "params": {"text": "Settings", "mode": "exact"}},
  {"type": "expect", "command": "ANY", "respond": {"result": "ok"}}
 ]}

The text is matched against the card's cached menu, case-insensitively by default (case_sensitive: true forces an exact-case match); the cache is refreshed whenever the card sends SET UP MENU (e.g. after an install + REFRESH). If the script must wait for the menu, add a status action and an expect SET UP MENU before the selection.

RFM update → file change → REFRESH (NAA init + full FCN)

{"name": "applet RFM update",
 "steps": [
  {"type": "action", "kind": "scp80",
   "params": {"apdu": "80E2900000", "tar": "B00001", "spi2": "01"},
   "check": {"sw": {"mode": "mask", "value": "91??"}, "por": "none"},
   "label": "RFM update"},
  {"type": "expect", "command": "REFRESH", "qualifier": "00",
   "checks": [{"kind": "files", "value": "3F007F206F07"}],
   "respond": {"result": "ok"}},
  {"type": "action", "kind": "file-read", "params": {"path": "MF/7F20/6F07"},
   "check": {"data": {"mode": "mask", "value": "AA??CC"}}}
 ]}

qualifier 00 is "NAA Initialization and Full File Change Notification"; the files check asserts the exact set of changed files the applet reports. For this mode the terminal must not reset the card (TS 102 223 §6.4.7), so the run continues - the following file-read verifies the updated content.

Incoming data → particular PoR, no other actions