1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Philipp Maier
7d5df4329f pySim-shell_test/euicc: ensure test-profile is enabled
When testing commands like get_profile_info, enable_profile,
disable_profile or the commands to manage notifications, we
should ensure that the correct profile is enabled before
executing the actual testcase.

Change-Id: Ie57b0305876bc5001ab3a9c3a3b5711408161b74
2026-02-10 11:34:31 +01:00
23 changed files with 110 additions and 1265 deletions

2
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
*.pyc
.*.sw?
.*.swp
/docs/_*
/docs/generated

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@@ -30,48 +30,6 @@ from pathlib import Path
logger = logging.getLogger(Path(__file__).stem)
option_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Tool to send OTA SMS RFM/RAM messages via SMPP',
formatter_class=argparse.ArgumentDefaultsHelpFormatter)
option_parser.add_argument("--host", help="Host/IP of the SMPP server", default="localhost")
option_parser.add_argument("--port", help="TCP port of the SMPP server", default=2775, type=int)
option_parser.add_argument("--system-id", help="System ID to use to bind to the SMPP server", default="test")
option_parser.add_argument("--password", help="Password to use to bind to the SMPP server", default="test")
option_parser.add_argument("--verbose", help="Enable verbose logging", action='store_true', default=False)
algo_crypt_choices = []
algo_crypt_classes = OtaAlgoCrypt.__subclasses__()
for cls in algo_crypt_classes:
algo_crypt_choices.append(cls.enum_name)
option_parser.add_argument("--algo-crypt", choices=algo_crypt_choices, default='triple_des_cbc2',
help="OTA crypt algorithm")
algo_auth_choices = []
algo_auth_classes = OtaAlgoAuth.__subclasses__()
for cls in algo_auth_classes:
algo_auth_choices.append(cls.enum_name)
option_parser.add_argument("--algo-auth", choices=algo_auth_choices, default='triple_des_cbc2',
help="OTA auth algorithm")
option_parser.add_argument('--kic', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='OTA key (KIC)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kic-idx', default=1, type=int, help='OTA key index (KIC)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kid', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='OTA key (KID)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kid-idx', default=1, type=int, help='OTA key index (KID)')
option_parser.add_argument('--cntr', default=0, type=int, help='replay protection counter')
option_parser.add_argument('--tar', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='Toolkit Application Reference')
option_parser.add_argument("--cntr-req", choices=CNTR_REQ.decmapping.values(), default='no_counter',
help="Counter requirement")
option_parser.add_argument('--no-ciphering', action='store_true', default=False, help='Disable ciphering')
option_parser.add_argument("--rc-cc-ds", choices=RC_CC_DS.decmapping.values(), default='cc',
help="message check (rc=redundency check, cc=crypt. checksum, ds=digital signature)")
option_parser.add_argument('--por-in-submit', action='store_true', default=False,
help='require PoR to be sent via SMS-SUBMIT')
option_parser.add_argument('--por-no-ciphering', action='store_true', default=False, help='Disable ciphering (PoR)')
option_parser.add_argument("--por-rc-cc-ds", choices=RC_CC_DS.decmapping.values(), default='cc',
help="PoR check (rc=redundency check, cc=crypt. checksum, ds=digital signature)")
option_parser.add_argument("--por-req", choices=POR_REQ.decmapping.values(), default='por_required',
help="Proof of Receipt requirements")
option_parser.add_argument('--src-addr', default='12', type=str, help='SMS source address (MSISDN)')
option_parser.add_argument('--dest-addr', default='23', type=str, help='SMS destination address (MSISDN)')
option_parser.add_argument('--timeout', default=10, type=int, help='Maximum response waiting time')
option_parser.add_argument('-a', '--apdu', action='append', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='C-APDU to send')
class SmppHandler:
client = None
@@ -183,7 +141,7 @@ class SmppHandler:
tuple containing the last response data and the last status word as byte strings
"""
logger.info("C-APDU sending: %s...", b2h(apdu))
logger.info("C-APDU sending: %s..." % b2h(apdu))
# translate to Secured OTA RFM
secured = self.ota_dialect.encode_cmd(self.ota_keyset, self.tar, self.spi, apdu=apdu)
@@ -209,28 +167,65 @@ class SmppHandler:
return h2b(resp), h2b(sw)
if __name__ == '__main__':
option_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='CSV importer for pySim-shell\'s PostgreSQL Card Key Provider',
formatter_class=argparse.ArgumentDefaultsHelpFormatter)
option_parser.add_argument("--host", help="Host/IP of the SMPP server", default="localhost")
option_parser.add_argument("--port", help="TCP port of the SMPP server", default=2775, type=int)
option_parser.add_argument("--system-id", help="System ID to use to bind to the SMPP server", default="test")
option_parser.add_argument("--password", help="Password to use to bind to the SMPP server", default="test")
option_parser.add_argument("--verbose", help="Enable verbose logging", action='store_true', default=False)
algo_crypt_choices = []
algo_crypt_classes = OtaAlgoCrypt.__subclasses__()
for cls in algo_crypt_classes:
algo_crypt_choices.append(cls.enum_name)
option_parser.add_argument("--algo-crypt", choices=algo_crypt_choices, default='triple_des_cbc2',
help="OTA crypt algorithm")
algo_auth_choices = []
algo_auth_classes = OtaAlgoAuth.__subclasses__()
for cls in algo_auth_classes:
algo_auth_choices.append(cls.enum_name)
option_parser.add_argument("--algo-auth", choices=algo_auth_choices, default='triple_des_cbc2',
help="OTA auth algorithm")
option_parser.add_argument('--kic', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='OTA key (KIC)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kic_idx', default=1, type=int, help='OTA key index (KIC)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kid', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='OTA key (KID)')
option_parser.add_argument('--kid_idx', default=1, type=int, help='OTA key index (KID)')
option_parser.add_argument('--cntr', default=0, type=int, help='replay protection counter')
option_parser.add_argument('--tar', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='Toolkit Application Reference')
option_parser.add_argument("--cntr_req", choices=CNTR_REQ.decmapping.values(), default='no_counter',
help="Counter requirement")
option_parser.add_argument('--ciphering', default=True, type=bool, help='Enable ciphering')
option_parser.add_argument("--rc-cc-ds", choices=RC_CC_DS.decmapping.values(), default='cc',
help="message check (rc=redundency check, cc=crypt. checksum, ds=digital signature)")
option_parser.add_argument('--por-in-submit', default=False, type=bool,
help='require PoR to be sent via SMS-SUBMIT')
option_parser.add_argument('--por-shall-be-ciphered', default=True, type=bool, help='require encrypted PoR')
option_parser.add_argument("--por-rc-cc-ds", choices=RC_CC_DS.decmapping.values(), default='cc',
help="PoR check (rc=redundency check, cc=crypt. checksum, ds=digital signature)")
option_parser.add_argument("--por_req", choices=POR_REQ.decmapping.values(), default='por_required',
help="Proof of Receipt requirements")
option_parser.add_argument('--src-addr', default='12', type=str, help='TODO')
option_parser.add_argument('--dest-addr', default='23', type=str, help='TODO')
option_parser.add_argument('--timeout', default=10, type=int, help='TODO')
option_parser.add_argument('-a', '--apdu', action='append', required=True, type=is_hexstr, help='C-APDU to send')
opts = option_parser.parse_args()
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG if opts.verbose else logging.INFO,
format='%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s',
datefmt='%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')
if opts.kic_idx != opts.kid_idx:
logger.warning("KIC index (%s) and KID index (%s) are different (security violation, card should reject message)",
opts.kic_idx, opts.kid_idx)
ota_keyset = OtaKeyset(algo_crypt=opts.algo_crypt,
kic_idx=opts.kic_idx,
kic=h2b(opts.kic),
algo_auth=opts.algo_auth,
kid_idx=opts.kid_idx,
kid_idx=opts.kic_idx,
kid=h2b(opts.kid),
cntr=opts.cntr)
spi = {'counter' : opts.cntr_req,
'ciphering' : not opts.no_ciphering,
'ciphering' : opts.ciphering,
'rc_cc_ds': opts.rc_cc_ds,
'por_in_submit': opts.por_in_submit,
'por_shall_be_ciphered': not opts.por_no_ciphering,
'por_in_submit':opts.por_in_submit,
'por_shall_be_ciphered':opts.por_shall_be_ciphered,
'por_rc_cc_ds': opts.por_rc_cc_ds,
'por': opts.por_req}
apdu = h2b("".join(opts.apdu))

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@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ pySim consists of several parts:
sim-rest
suci-keytool
saip-tool
smpp-ota-tool
Indices and tables

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@@ -1,842 +0,0 @@
Guide: Managing GP Keys
=======================
Most of todays smartcards follow the GlobalPlatform Card Specification and the included Security Domain model.
UICCs and eUCCCs are no exception here.
The Security Domain acts as an on-card representative of a card authority or administrator. It is used to perform tasks
like the installation of applications or the provisioning and rotation of secure channel keys. It also acts as a secure
key storage and offers all kinds of cryptographic services to applications that are installed under a specific
Security Domain (see also GlobalPlatform Card Specification, section 7).
In this tutorial, we will show how to work with the key material (keysets) stored inside a Security Domain and how to
rotate (replace) existing keys. We will also show how to provision new keys.
.. warning:: Making changes to keysets requires extreme caution as misconfigured keysets may lock you out permanently.
It also strongly recommended to maintain at least one backup keyset that you can use as fallback in case
the primary keyset becomes unusable for some reason.
Selecting a Security Domain
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A typical smartcard, such as an UICC will have one primary Security Domain, called the Issuer Security Domain (ISD).
When working with those cards, the ISD will show up in the UICC filesystem tree as `ADF.ISD` and can be selected like
any other file.
::
pySIM-shell (00:MF)> select ADF.ISD
{
"application_id": "a000000003000000",
"proprietary_data": {
"maximum_length_of_data_field_in_command_message": 255
}
}
When working with eUICCs, multiple Security Domains are involved. The model is slightly different from the classic
model with one primary ISD. In the case of eUICCs, an ISD-R and an ISD-P exists.
The ISD-R (Issuer Security Domain - Root) is indeed the primary ISD. Its purpose is to handle the installation of new
profiles and to manage the already installed profiles. The ISD-R shows up as a `ADF.ISD-R` and can be selected normally
(see above) The key material that allows access to the ISD-R is usually only known to the eUICC manufacturer.
The ISD-P (Issuer Security Domain - Profile) is the primary ISD of the currently enabled profile. The ISD-P is
comparable to the ISD we find on a UICC. The key material for the ISD-P should be known known to the ISP, which
is the owner of the installed profile.
Since the AID of the ISD-P is allocated during the profile installation and different for each profile, it is not known
by pySim-shell. This means there will no `ADF.ISD-P` file show up in the file system, but we can simply select the
ISD-R, request the AID of the ISD-P and switch over to that ISD-P using a raw APDU:
``00a4040410`` + ``a0000005591010ffffffff8900001000`` + ``00``
::
pySIM-shell (00:MF)> select ADF.ISD-R
{
"application_id": "a0000005591010ffffffff8900000100",
"proprietary_data": {
"maximum_length_of_data_field_in_command_message": 255
},
"isdr_proprietary_application_template": {
"supported_version_number": "020300"
}
}
pySIM-shell (00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)> get_profiles_info
{
"profile_info_seq": {
"profile_info": {
"iccid": "8949449999999990023",
"isdp_aid": "a0000005591010ffffffff8900001000",
"profile_state": "enabled",
"service_provider_name": "OsmocomSPN",
"profile_name": "TS48V1-A-UNIQUE",
"profile_class": "operational"
}
}
}
pySIM-shell (00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)> apdu 00a4040410a0000005591010ffffffff890000100000
SW: 9000, RESP: 6f188410a0000005591010ffffffff8900001000a5049f6501ff
pySIM-shell (00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)>
After that, the prompt will still show the ADF.ISD-R, but we are actually in ADF.ISD-P and the standard GlobalPlatform
operations like `establish_scpXX`, `get_data`, and `put_key` should work. The same workaround can also be applied to any
Supplementary Security Domain as well, provided that the AID is known to the user.
Establishing a secure channel
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Before we can make changes to the keysets in the currently selected Security Domain we must first establish a secure channel
with that Security Domain. The secure channel protocols commonly used for this are `SCP02` (see also GlobalPlatform Card
Specification, section E.1.1) and `SCP03` (see also GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment D). `SCP02` is slightly
older and commonly used on UICCs. The more modern `SCP03` is commonly used on eUICCs. The main difference between the
two is that `SCP02` uses 3DES while `SCP03` is based on AES.
.. warning:: Secure channel protocols like `SCP02` and `SCP03` may manage an error counter to count failed login
attempts. This means attempting to establish a secure channel with a wrong keyset multiple times may lock
you out permanently. Double check the applied keyset before attempting to establish a secure channel.
Example: `SCP02`
----------------
In the following example, we assume that we want to establish a secure channel with the ISD of a `sysmoUSIM-SJA5` UICC.
Along with the card we have received the following keyset:
+---------+----------------------------------+
| Keyname | Keyvalue |
+=========+==================================+
| ENC/KIC | F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10 |
+---------+----------------------------------+
| MAC/KID | 01981F4A20999F62AF99988007BAF6CA |
+---------+----------------------------------+
| DEK/KIK | 8F8AEE5CDCC5D361368BC45673D99195 |
+---------+----------------------------------+
This keyset is tied to the key version number KVN 122 and is configured as a DES keyset. We can use this keyset to
establish a secure channel using the SCP02 Secure Channel Protocol.
::
pySIM-shell (00:MF/ADF.ISD)> establish_scp02 --key-enc F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10 --key-mac 01981F4A20999F62AF99988007BAF6CA --key-dek 8F8AEE5CDCC5D361368BC45673D99195 --security-level 3
Successfully established a SCP02[03] secure channel
Example: `SCP03`
----------------
The establishment of a secure channel via SCP03 works just the same. In the following example we will establish a
secure channel to the ISD-R of an eUICC. The SCP03 keyset we use is tied to KVN 50 and looks like this:
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Keyname | Keyvalue |
+=========+==================================================================+
| ENC/KIC | 620ff456b0c0328b68dc0d7d5eb24e07dd749aa86c9ff1836a7263e1d8896510 |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MAC/KID | b38116a2c85f2c8f46bbdc0081d6e8a04b0a58087d0ce5ee0ccc4c945e4aeda6 |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEK/KIK | d409486cbcb8092a8592ee46d8668dfa97bea5eb7ce9c2b5a3f3bb1db358a153 |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
We assume that ADF.ISD-R is already selected. We may now establish the SCP03 secure channel:
::
pySIM-shell (00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)> establish_scp03 --key-enc 620ff456b0c0328b68dc0d7d5eb24e07dd749aa86c9ff1836a7263e1d8896510 --key-mac b38116a2c85f2c8f46bbdc0081d6e8a04b0a58087d0ce5ee0ccc4c945e4aeda6 --key-dek d409486cbcb8092a8592ee46d8668dfa97bea5eb7ce9c2b5a3f3bb1db358a153 --key-ver 50 --security-level 3
Successfully established a SCP03[03] secure channel
Understanding Keysets
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Before making any changes to keysets, it is recommended to check the status of the currently installed keysets. To do
so, we use the `get_data` command to retrieve the `key_information`. We cannot read back the key values themselves, but
we get a summary of the installed keys together with their KVN numbers, IDs, algorithm and key length values.
Example: `key_information` from a `sysmoISIM-SJA5`:
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 112,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 112,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 112,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 1,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 1,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 1,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 2,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 2,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 2,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 47,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 47,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 47,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
}
]
}
Example: `key_information` from a `sysmoEUICC1-C2T`:
::
pySIM-shell (SCP03[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 50,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 50,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 50,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 64,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 64,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "tls_psk",
"length": 16
}
]
}
}
]
}
The output from those two examples above may seem lengthy, but in order to move on and to provision own keys
successfully, it is important to understand each aspect of it.
Key Version Number (KVN)
------------------------
Each key is associated with a Key Version Number (KVN). Multiple keys that share the same KVN belong to the same
keyset. In the first example above we can see that four keysets with KVN numbers 112, 1, 2 and 47 are provisioned.
In the second example we see two keysets. One with KVN 50 and one with KVN 64.
The term "Key Version Number" is misleading as this number is not really a version number. It's actually a unique
identifier for a specific keyset that also defines with which Secure Channel Protocol a key can be used. This means
that the KVN is not just an arbitrary number. The following (incomplete) table gives a hint which KVN numbers may be
used with which Secure Channel Protocol.
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| KVN range | Secure Channel Protocol |
+===========+=======================================================+
| 1-15 | reserved for `SCP80` (OTA SMS) |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 17 | reserved for DAP specified in ETSI TS 102 226 |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 32-47 | reserved for `SCP02` |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 48-63 | reserved for `SCP03` |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 112 | Token key (RSA public or DES, also used with `SCP02`) |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 113 | Receipt key (DES) |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 115 | DAP verifiation key (RS public or DES) |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 116 | reserved for CASD |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 117 | 16-byte DES key for Ciphered Load File Data Block |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 129-143 | reserved for `SCP81` |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 255 | reserved for ISD with SCP02 without SCP80 support |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
With that we can now understand that in the first example, the first and the last keyset is intended to be used with
`SCP02` and that the second and the third keyset is intended to be used with `SCP80` (OTA SMS). In the second example we
can see that the first keyset is intended to be used with `SCP03`, wheres the second should be usable with `SCP81`.
Key Identifier
--------------
Each keyset consists of a number of keys, where each key has a different Key Identifier. The Key Identifier is usually
an incrementing number that starts counting at 1. The Key Identifier is used to distinguish the keys within the keyset.
The exact number of keys and their attributes depends on the secure channel protocol for which the keyset is intended
for. Each secure channel protocol may have its specific requirements on how many keys of which which type, length or
Key Identifier have to be present.
However, almost all of the classic secure channel protocols (including `SCP02`, `SCP03` and `SCP81`) make use of the
following three-key scheme:
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Purpose |
+================+=========+=======================================+
| 1 | ENC/KIC | encryption/decryption |
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
| 2 | MAC/KID | cryptographic checksumming/signing |
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
| 3 | DEK/KIK | encryption/decryption of key material |
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
In this case, all three keys share the same length and are used with the same algorithm. The key length is often used
to implicitly select sub-types of an algorithm. (e.g. a 16 byte key of type `aes` is associated with `AES128`, where a 32
byte key would be associated with `AES256`).
That different schemes are possible shows the second example. The `SCP80` keyset from the second example uses a scheme
that works with two keys:
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Purpose |
+================+=========+=======================================+
| 1 | TLS-PSK | pre-shared key used for TLS |
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
| 2 | DEK/KIK | encryption/decryption of key material |
+----------------+---------+---------------------------------------+
It should also be noted that the order in which keysets and keys appear is an implementation detail of the UICC/eUICC
O/S. The order has no influence on how a keyset is interpreted. Only the Key Version Number (KVN) and the Key Identifier
matter.
Rotating a keyset
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Rotating keys is one of the most basic tasks one might want to perform on an UICC/eUICC before using it productively. In
the following example we will illustrate how key rotation can be done. When rotating keys, only the key itself may
change. For example it is not possible to change the key length or the algorithm used (see also GlobalPlatform Card
Specification, section 11.8.2.3.3). Any key of the current Security Domain can be rotated, this also includes the key
that was used to establish the secure channel.
In the following example we assume that the Security Domain is selected and a secure channel is already established. We
intend to rotate the keyset with KVN 112. Since this keyset uses triple DES keys with a key length of 16, we must
replace it with a keyset with keys of the same nature.
The new keyset shall look like this:
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Keyvalue |
+================+=========+==================================+
| 1 | ENC/KIC | 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 2 | MAC/KID | 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 3 | DEK/KIK | 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
When passing the keys to the `put_key` commandline, we set the Key Identifier of the first key using the `--key-id`
parameter. This Key Identifier will be valid for the first key (KIC) we pass. For all consecutive keys, the Key
Identifier will be incremented automatically (see also GlobalPlatform Card Specification, section 11.8.2.2). To Ensure
that the new KIC, KID and KIK keys get the correct Key Identifiers, it is crucial to maintain order when passing the
keys in the `--key-data` arguments. It is also important that each `--key-data` argument is preceded by a `--key-type`
argument that sets the algorithm correctly (`des` in this case).
Finally we have to target the keyset we want to rotate by its KVN. The `--old-key-version-nr` argument is set to 112
as this is identifies the keyset we want to rotate. The `--key-version-nr` is also set to 112 as we do not want to the
KVN to be changed in this example. Changing the KVN while rotating a keyset is possible. In case the KVN has to change
for some reason, the new KVN must be selected carefully to keep the key usable with the associated Secure Channel
Protocol.
The commandline that matches the keyset we had laid out above looks like this:
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> put_key --key-id 1 --key-type des --key-data 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 --key-type des --key-data 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C --key-type des --key-data 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B --old-key-version-nr 112 --key-version-nr 112
After executing this put_key commandline, the keyset identified by KVN 122 is equipped with new keys. We can use
`get_data key_information` to inspect the currently installed keysets. The output should appear unchanged as
we only swapped out the keys. All other parameters, identifiers etc. should remain constant.
.. warning:: It is technically possible to rotate a keyset in a `non atomic` way using one `put_key` commandline for
each key. However, in case the targeted keyset is the one used to establish the current secure channel,
this method should not be used since, depending on the UICC/eUICC model, half-written key material may
interrupt the current secure channel.
Removing a keyset
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In some cases it is necessary to remove a keyset entirely. This can be done with the `delete_key` command. Here it is
important to understand that `delete_key` only removes one specific key from a specific keyset. This means that you
need to run a separate `delete_key` command for each key inside a keyset.
In the following example we assume that the Security Domain is selected and a secure channel is already established. We
intend to remove the keyset with KVN 112. This keyset consists of three keys.
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> delete_key --key-ver 112 --key-id 1
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> delete_key --key-ver 112 --key-id 2
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> delete_key --key-ver 112 --key-id 3
To verify that the keyset has been deleted properly, we can use the `get_data key_information` command to inspect the
current status of the installed keysets. We should see that the key with KVN 112 is no longer present.
Adding a keyset
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In the following we will discuss how to add an entirely new keyset. The procedure is almost identical with the key
rotation procedure we have already discussed and it is assumed that all details about the key rotation are understood.
In this section we will go into more detail and and illustrate how to provision new 3DES, `AES128` and `AES256` keysets.
It is important to keep in mind that storage space on smartcard is a precious resource. In many cases the amount of
keysets that a Security Domain can store is limited. In some situations you may be forced to sacrifice one of your
existing keysets in favor of a new keyset.
The main difference between key rotation and the adding of new keys is that we do not simply replace an existing key.
Instead an entirely new key is programmed into the Security Domain. Therefore the `put_key` commandline will have no
`--old-key-version-nr` parameter. From the commandline perspective, this is already the only visible difference from a
commandline that simply rotates a keyset. Since we are writing an entirely new keyset, we are free to chose the
algorithm and the key length within the parameter range permitted by the targeted secure channel protocol. Otherwise
the same rules apply.
For reference, it should be mentioned that it is also possible to add or rotate keyset using multiple `put_key`
commandlines. In this case one `put_key` commandline for each key is used. Each commandline will specify `--key-id` and
`--key-version-nr` and one `--key-type` and `--key-data` tuple. However, when rotating or adding a keyset step-by-step,
the whole process happens in a `non-atomic` way, which is less reliable. Therefore we will favor the `atomic method`
In the following examples we assume that the Security Domain is selected and a secure channel is already established.
Example: `3DES` key for `SCP02`
-------------------------------
Let's assume we want to provision a new 3DES keyset that we can use for SCP02. The keyset shall look like this:
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Keyvalue |
+================+=========+==================================+
| 1 | ENC/KIC | 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 2 | MAC/KID | 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 3 | DEK/KIK | 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
The keyset shall be a associated with the KVN 46. We have made sure before that KVN 46 is still unused and that this
KVN number is actually suitable for SCP02 keys. As we are using 3DES, it is obvious that we have to pass 3 keys with 16
byte length.
To program the key, we may use the following commandline. As we can see, this commandline is almost the exact same as
the one from the key rotation example where we were rotating a 3DES key. The only difference is that we didn't specify
an old KVN number and that we have chosen a different KVN.
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> put_key --key-id 1 --key-type des --key-data 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 --key-type des --key-data 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C --key-type des --key-data 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B --key-version-nr 46
In case of success, the keyset should appear in the `key_information` among the other keysets that are already present.
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 46,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 46,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 46,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "des",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
...
]
}
Example: `AES128` key for `SCP80`
---------------------------------
In this example we intend to provision a new `AES128` keyset that we can use with SCP80 (OTA SMS). The keyset shall look
like this:
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Keyvalue |
+================+=========+==================================+
| 1 | ENC/KIC | 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 2 | MAC/KID | 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 3 | DEK/KIK | 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
In addition to that, we want to associate this key with KVN 3. We have inspected the currently installed keysets before
and made sure that KVN 3 is still unused. We are also aware that for SCP80 we may only use KVN values from 1 to 15.
For `AES128`, we specify the algorithm using the `--key-type aes` parameter. The selection between `AES128` and `AES256` is
done implicitly using the key length. Since we want to use `AES128` in this case, all three keys have a length of 16 byte.
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> put_key --key-id 1 --key-type aes --key-data 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 --key-type aes --key-data 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C --key-type aes --key-data 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B --key-version-nr 3
In case of success, the keyset should appear in the `key_information` among the other keysets that are already present.
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 3,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 3,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 3,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
...
]
}
Example: `AES256` key for `SCP03`
---------------------------------
Let's assume we want to provision a new `AES256` keyset that we can use for SCP03. The keyset shall look like this:
+----------------+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Keyvalue |
+================+=========+==================================================================+
| 1 | ENC/KIC | 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 |
+----------------+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | MAC/KID | 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C |
+----------------+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | DEK/KIK | 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B |
+----------------+---------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
In addition to that, we assume that we want to associate this key with KVN 51. This KVN number falls in the range of
48 - 63 and is therefore suitable for a key that shall be usable with SCP03. We also made sure before that KVN 51 is
still unused.
With that we can go ahead and make up the following commandline:
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> put_key --key-id 1 --key-type aes --key-data 542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5542C37A6043679F2F9F71116418B1CD5 --key-type aes --key-data 34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C34F11BAC8E5390B57F4E601372339E3C --key-type aes --key-data 5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B5524F4BECFE96FB63FC29D6BAAC6058B --key-version-nr 51
In case of success, we should see the keyset in the `key_information`
::
pySIM-shell (SCP02[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 51,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 51,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 3,
"key_version_number": 51,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 32
}
]
}
},
...
]
}
Example: `AES128` key for `SCP81`
---------------------------------
In this example we will show how to provision a new `AES128` keyset for `SCP81`. We will provision this keyset under
KVN 64. The keyset we intend to apply shall look like this:
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| Key Identifier | Keyname | Keyvalue |
+================+=========+==================================+
| 1 | TLS-PSK | 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
| 2 | DEK/KIK | 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f |
+----------------+---------+----------------------------------+
With that we can put together the following command line:
::
put_key --key-id 1 --key-type tls_psk --key-data 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f --key-type aes --key-data 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f --key-version-nr 64
In case of success, the keyset should appear in the `key_information` as follows:
::
pySIM-shell (SCP03[03]:00:MF/ADF.ISD-R)> get_data key_information
{
"key_information": [
...,
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 2,
"key_version_number": 64,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "aes",
"length": 16
}
]
}
},
{
"key_information_data": {
"key_identifier": 1,
"key_version_number": 64,
"key_types": [
{
"type": "tls_psk",
"length": 16
}
]
}
}
]
}

View File

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Usage Examples
suci-tutorial
cap-tutorial
put_key-tutorial
Advanced Topics
---------------

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@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
smpp-ota-tool
=============
The `smpp-ota-tool` allows users to send OTA SMS messages containing APDU scripts (RFM, RAM) via an SMPP server. The
intended audience are developers who want to test/evaluate the OTA SMS interface of a SIM/UICC/eUICC. `smpp-ota-tool`
is intended to be used as a companion tool for :ref:`pySim-smpp2sim`, however it should be usable on any other SMPP
server (such as a production SMSC of a live cellular network) as well.
From the technical perspective `smpp-ota-tool` takes the role of an SMPP ESME. It takes care of the encoding, encryption
and checksumming (signing) of the RFM/RAM OTA SMS and eventually submits it to the SMPP server. The program then waits
for a response. The response is automatically parsed and printed on stdout. This makes the program also suitable to be
called from shell scripts.
.. note:: In the following we will we will refer to `SIM` as one of the following: `SIM`, `USIM`, `ISIM`, `UICC`,
`eUICC`, `eSIM`.
Applying OTA keys
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Depending on the `SIM` type you will receive one or more sets of keys which you can use to communicate with the `SIM`
through a secure channel protocol. When using the OTA SMS method, the SCP80 protocol is used and it therefore crucial
to use a keyset that is actually suitable for SCP80.
A keyset usually consists of three keys:
#. KIC: the key used for ciphering (encryption/decryption)
#. KID: the key used to compute a cryptographic checksum (signing)
#. KIK: the key used to encrypt/decrypt key material (key rotation, adding of new keys)
From the transport security perspective, only KIC and KID are relevant. The KIK (also referenced as "Data Encryption
Key", DEK) is only used when keys are rotated or new keys are added (see also ETSI TS 102 226, section 8.2.1.5).
When the keyset is programmed into the security domain of the `SIM`, it is tied to a specific cryptographic algorithm
(3DES, AES128 or AES256) and a so called Key Version Number (KVN). The term "Key Version Number" is misleading, since
it is actually not a version number. It is a unique identifier of a certain keyset which also identifies for which
secure channel protocol the keyset may be used. Keysets with a KVN from 1-15 (``0x01``-``0x0F``) are suitable for SCP80.
This means that it is not only important to know just the KIC/KID/KIK keys. Also the related algorithms and the KVN
numbers must be known.
.. note:: SCP80 keysets typically start counting from 1 upwards. Typical configurations use a set of 3 keysets with
KVN numbers 1-3.
Addressing an Application
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When communicating with a specific application on a `SIM` via SCP80, it is important to address that application with
the correct parameters. The following two parameters must be known in advance:
#. TAR: The Toolkit Application Reference (TAR) number is a three byte value that uniquely addresses an application
on the `SIM`. The exact values may vary (see also ETSI TS 101 220, Table D.1).
#. MSL: The Minimum Security Level (MSL) is a bit-field that dictates which of the security measures encoded in the
SPI are mandatory (see also ETSI TS 102 225, section 5.1.1).
A practical example
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. note:: This tutorial assumes that pySim-smpp2sim is running on the local machine with its default parameters.
See also :ref:`pySim-smpp2sim`.
Let's assume that an OTA SMS shall be sent to the SIM RFM application of an sysmoISIM-SJA2. What we want to do is to
select DF.GSM and to get the select response back.
We have received the following key material from the `SIM` vendor:
::
KIC1: F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10
KID1: 01981F4A20999F62AF99988007BAF6CA
KIK1: 8F8AEE5CDCC5D361368BC45673D99195
KIC2: 01022916E945B656FDE03F806A105FA2
KID2: D326CB69F160333CC5BD1495D448EFD6
KIK2: 08037E0590DFE049D4975FFB8652F625
KIC3: 2B22824D0D27A3A1CEEC512B312082B4
KID3: F1697766925A11F4458295590137B672
KIK3: C7EE69B2C5A1C8E160DD36A38EB517B3
Those are three keysets. The enumeration is directly equal to the KVN used. All three keysets are 3DES keys, which
means triple_des_cbc2 is the correct algorithm to use.
.. note:: The key set configuration can be confirmed by retrieving the key configuration using
`get_data key_information` from within an SCP02 session on ADF.ISD.
In this example we intend to address the SIM RFM application on the `SIM`. Which according to the manual has TAR ``B00010``
and MSL ``0x06``. When we hold ``0x06`` = ``0b00000110`` against the SPI coding chart (see also ETSI TS 102 225,
section 5.1.1). We can deduct that Ciphering and Cryptographic Checksum are mandatory.
.. note:: The MSL (see also ETSI TS 102 226, section 6.1) is assigned to an application by the `SIM` issuer. It is a
custom decision and may vary with different `SIM` types/profiles. In the case of sysmoISIM-SJS1/SJA2/SJA5 the
counter requirement has been waived to simplify lab/research type use. In productive environments, `SIM`
applications should ideally use an MSL that makes the counter mandatory.
In order to select DF.GSM (``0x7F20``) and to retrieve the select response, two APDUs are needed. The first APDU is the
select command ``A0A40000027F20`` and the second is the related get-response command ``A0C0000016``. Those APDUs will be
concatenated and are sent in a single message. The message containing the concatenated APDUs works as a script that
is received by the SIM RFM application and then executed. This method poses some limitations that have to be taken into
account when making requests like this (see also ETSI TS 102 226, section 5).
With this information we may now construct a commandline for `smpp-ota-tool.py`. We will pass the KVN as kid_idx and
kic_idx (see also ETSI TS 102 225, Table 2, fields `KIc` and `KID`). Both index values should refer to the same
keyset/KVN as keysets should not be mixed. (`smpp-ota-tool` still provides separate parameters anyway to allow testing
with invalid keyset combinations)
::
$ PYTHONPATH=./ ./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py --kic F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10 --kid 01981F4A20999F62AF99988107BAF6CA --kid_idx 1 --kic_idx 1 --algo-crypt triple_des_cbc2 --algo-auth triple_des_cbc2 --tar B00010 --apdu A0A40000027F20 --apdu A0C0000016
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO Connecting to localhost:2775...
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO C-APDU sending: a0a40000027f20a0c0000016...
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO SMS-TPDU sending: 02700000281506191515b00010da1d6cbbd0d11ce4330d844c7408340943e843f67a6d7b0674730881605fd62d...
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO SMS-TPDU sent, waiting for response...
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO SMS-TPDU received: 027100002c12b000107ddf58d1780f771638b3975759f4296cf5c31efc87a16a1b61921426baa16da1b5ba1a9951d59a39
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO SMS-TPDU decoded: (Container(rpl=44, rhl=18, tar=b'\xb0\x00\x10', cntr=b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00', pcntr=0, response_status=uEnumIntegerString.new(0, 'por_ok'), cc_rc=b'\x8f\xea\xf5.\xf4\x0e\xc2\x14', secured_data=b'\x02\x90\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\x7f \x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\t\xb1\x065\x04\x00\x83\x8a\x83\x8a'), Container(number_of_commands=2, last_status_word=u'9000', last_response_data=u'0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a'))
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO R-APDU received: 0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000
0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000
2026-02-26 17:13:56 INFO Disconnecting...
The result we see is the select response of DF.GSM and a status word indicating that the last command has been
processed normally.
As we can see, this mechanism now allows us to perform small administrative tasks remotely. We can read the contents of
files remotely or make changes to files. Depending on the changes we make, there may be security issues arising from
replay attacks. With the commandline above, the communication is encrypted and protected by a cryptographic checksum,
so an adversary can neither read, nor alter the message. However, an adversary could still replay an intercepted
message and the `SIM` would happily execute the contained APDUs again.
To prevent this, we may include a replay protection counter within the message. In this case, the MSL indicates that a
replay protection counter is not required. However, to extended the security of our messages, we may chose to use a
counter anyway. In the following example, we will encode a counter value of 100. We will instruct the `SIM` to make sure
that the value we send is higher than the counter value that is currently stored in the `SIM`.
To add a replay connection counter we add the commandline arguments `--cntr-req` to set the counter requirement and
`--cntr` to pass the counter value.
::
$ PYTHONPATH=./ ./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py --kic F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10 --kid 01981F4A20999F62AF99988107BAF6CA --kid_idx 1 --kic_idx 1 --algo-crypt triple_des_cbc2 --algo-auth triple_des_cbc2 --tar B00010 --apdu A0A40000027F20 --apdu A0C0000016 --cntr-req counter_must_be_higher --cntr 100
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO Connecting to localhost:2775...
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO C-APDU sending: a0a40000027f20a0c0000016...
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO SMS-TPDU sending: 02700000281516191515b000103a4f599e94f2b5dcfbbda984761b7977df6514c57a580fb4844787c436d2eade...
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO SMS-TPDU sent, waiting for response...
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO SMS-TPDU received: 027100002c12b0001049fb0315f6c6401b553867f412cefaf9355b38271178edb342a3bc9cc7e670cdc1f45eea6ffcbb39
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO SMS-TPDU decoded: (Container(rpl=44, rhl=18, tar=b'\xb0\x00\x10', cntr=b'\x00\x00\x00\x00d', pcntr=0, response_status=uEnumIntegerString.new(0, 'por_ok'), cc_rc=b'\xa9/\xc7\xc9\x00"\xab5', secured_data=b'\x02\x90\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\x7f \x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\t\xb1\x065\x04\x00\x83\x8a\x83\x8a'), Container(number_of_commands=2, last_status_word=u'9000', last_response_data=u'0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a'))
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO R-APDU received: 0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000
0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000
2026-02-26 17:16:39 INFO Disconnecting...
The `SIM` has accepted the message. The message got processed and the `SIM` has set its internal to 100. As an experiment,
we may try to re-use the counter value:
::
$ PYTHONPATH=./ ./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py --kic F09C43EE1A0391665CC9F05AF4E0BD10 --kid 01981F4A20999F62AF99988107BAF6CA --kid_idx 1 --kic_idx 1 --algo-crypt triple_des_cbc2 --algo-auth triple_des_cbc2 --tar B00010 --apdu A0A40000027F20 --apdu A0C0000016 --cntr-req counter_must_be_higher --cntr 100
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO Connecting to localhost:2775...
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO C-APDU sending: a0a40000027f20a0c0000016...
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO SMS-TPDU sending: 02700000281516191515b000103a4f599e94f2b5dcfbbda984761b7977df6514c57a580fb4844787c436d2eade...
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO SMS-TPDU sent, waiting for response...
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO SMS-TPDU received: 027100000b0ab0001000000000000006
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO SMS-TPDU decoded: (Container(rpl=11, rhl=10, tar=b'\xb0\x00\x10', cntr=b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00', pcntr=0, response_status=uEnumIntegerString.new(6, 'undefined_security_error'), cc_rc=b'', secured_data=b''), None)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/user/work/git_master/pysim/./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py", line 238, in <module>
resp, sw = smpp_handler.transceive_apdu(apdu, opts.src_addr, opts.dest_addr, opts.timeout)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/user/work/git_master/pysim/./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py", line 162, in transceive_apdu
raise ValueError("Response does not contain any last_response_data, no R-APDU received!")
ValueError: Response does not contain any last_response_data, no R-APDU received!
2026-02-26 17:16:43 INFO Disconnecting...
As we can see, the `SIM` has rejected the message with an `undefined_security_error`. The replay-protection-counter
ensures that a message can only be sent once.
.. note:: The replay-protection-counter is implemented as a 5 byte integer value (see also ETSI TS 102 225, Table 3).
When the counter has reached its maximum, it will not overflow nor can it be reset.
smpp-ota-tool syntax
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. argparse::
:module: contrib.smpp-ota-tool
:func: option_parser
:prog: contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py

View File

@@ -55,5 +55,3 @@ And once your external program is sending SMS to the simulated SMSC, it will log
SMSPPDownload(DeviceIdentities({'source_dev_id': 'network', 'dest_dev_id': 'uicc'}),Address({'ton_npi': 0, 'call_number': '0123456'}),SMS_TPDU({'tpdu': '400290217ff6227052000000002d02700000281516191212b0000127fa28a5bac69d3c5e9df2c7155dfdde449c826b236215566530787b30e8be5d'}))
INFO root: ENVELOPE: d147820283818604001032548b3b400290217ff6227052000000002d02700000281516191212b0000127fa28a5bac69d3c5e9df2c7155dfdde449c826b236215566530787b30e8be5d
INFO root: SW 9000: 027100002412b000019a551bb7c28183652de0ace6170d0e563c5e949a3ba56747fe4c1dbbef16642c
.. note:: for sending OTA SMS messages :ref:`smpp-ota-tool` may be used.

View File

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ class EF_AD(TransparentEF):
cell_test = 0x04
def __init__(self, fid='6f43', sfid=None, name='EF.AD',
desc='Administrative Data', size=(3, None), **kwargs):
desc='Service Provider Name', size=(3, None), **kwargs):
super().__init__(fid, sfid=sfid, name=name, desc=desc, size=size, **kwargs)
self._construct = Struct(
# Byte 1: Display Condition

View File

@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ def compile_asn1_subdir(subdir_name:str, codec='der'):
__ver = sys.version_info
if (__ver.major, __ver.minor) >= (3, 9):
for i in resources.files('pySim.esim').joinpath('asn1').joinpath(subdir_name).iterdir():
if not i.name.endswith('.asn'):
continue
asn_txt += i.read_text()
asn_txt += "\n"
#else:

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import abc
import requests
import logging
import json
from re import match
from typing import Optional
import base64
from twisted.web.server import Request
@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ class JsonHttpApiFunction(abc.ABC):
# additional custom HTTP headers (server responses)
extra_http_res_headers = {}
def __new__(cls, *args, role = 'legacy_client', **kwargs):
def __new__(cls, *args, role = None, **kwargs):
"""
Args:
args: (see JsonHttpApiClient and JsonHttpApiServer)
@@ -220,13 +221,14 @@ class JsonHttpApiFunction(abc.ABC):
# Create a dictionary with the class attributes of this class (the properties listed above and the encode_
# decode_ methods below). The dictionary will not include any dunder/magic methods
cls_attr = {attr_name: getattr(cls, attr_name) for attr_name in dir(cls) if not attr_name.startswith('__')}
cls_attr = { attr_name: getattr(cls, attr_name) for attr_name in dir(cls) if not match("__.*__", attr_name) }
# Normal instantiation as JsonHttpApiFunction:
if len(args) == 0 and len(kwargs) == 0:
if len(args) == 0:
return type(cls.__name__, (abc.ABC,), cls_attr)()
# Instantiation as as JsonHttpApiFunction with a JsonHttpApiClient or JsonHttpApiServer base
role = kwargs.get('role', 'legacy_client')
if role == 'legacy_client':
# Deprecated: With the advent of the server role (JsonHttpApiServer) the API had to be changed. To maintain
# compatibility with existing code (out-of-tree) the original behaviour and API interface and behaviour had

View File

@@ -151,8 +151,6 @@ class File:
self.df_name = None
self.fill_pattern = None
self.fill_pattern_repeat = False
self.pstdo = None # pinStatusTemplateDO, mandatory for DF/ADF
self.lcsi = None # optional life cycle status indicator
# apply some defaults from profile
if self.template:
self.from_template(self.template)
@@ -280,8 +278,6 @@ class File:
elif self.file_type in ['MF', 'DF', 'ADF']:
fdb_dec['file_type'] = 'df'
fdb_dec['structure'] = 'no_info_given'
# pinStatusTemplateDO is mandatory for DF/ADF
fileDescriptor['pinStatusTemplateDO'] = self.pstdo
# build file descriptor based on above input data
fd_dict = {}
if len(fdb_dec):
@@ -308,8 +304,6 @@ class File:
# desired fill or repeat pattern in the "proprietaryEFInfo" element for the EF in Profiles
# downloaded to a V2.2 or earlier eUICC.
fileDescriptor['proprietaryEFInfo'] = pefi
if self.lcsi:
fileDescriptor['lcsi'] = self.lcsi
logger.debug("%s: to_fileDescriptor(%s)" % (self, fileDescriptor))
return fileDescriptor
@@ -329,8 +323,6 @@ class File:
if efFileSize:
self._file_size = self._decode_file_size(efFileSize)
self.pstdo = fileDescriptor.get('pinStatusTemplateDO', None)
self.lcsi = fileDescriptor.get('lcsi', None)
pefi = fileDescriptor.get('proprietaryEFInfo', {})
securityAttributesReferenced = fileDescriptor.get('securityAttributesReferenced', None)
if securityAttributesReferenced:

View File

@@ -352,7 +352,6 @@ class SmspTpScAddr(ConfigurableParameter):
strip_chars = ' \t\r\n'
max_len = 21 # '+' and 20 digits
min_len = 1
example_input = '+49301234567'
@classmethod
def validate_val(cls, val):
@@ -628,7 +627,7 @@ class MilenageRotationConstants(BinaryParam, AlgoConfig):
name = 'MilenageRotation'
algo_config_key = 'rotationConstants'
allow_len = 5 # length in bytes (from BinaryParam)
example_input = '40 00 20 40 60'
example_input = '0a 0b 0c 0d 0e'
@classmethod
def validate_val(cls, val):

View File

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ class SeqNumber(BER_TLV_IE, tag=0x80):
class NotificationAddress(BER_TLV_IE, tag=0x0c):
_construct = Utf8Adapter(GreedyBytes)
class Iccid(BER_TLV_IE, tag=0x5a):
_construct = PaddedBcdAdapter(GreedyBytes)
_construct = BcdAdapter(GreedyBytes)
class NotificationMetadata(BER_TLV_IE, tag=0xbf2f, nested=[SeqNumber, ProfileMgmtOperation,
NotificationAddress, Iccid]):
pass

View File

@@ -266,13 +266,11 @@ class SCP02(SCP):
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
def dek_encrypt(self, plaintext:bytes) -> bytes:
# See also GPC section B.1.1.2, E.4.7, and E.4.1
cipher = DES3.new(self.sk.data_enc, DES.MODE_ECB)
cipher = DES.new(self.card_keys.dek[:8], DES.MODE_ECB)
return cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
def dek_decrypt(self, ciphertext:bytes) -> bytes:
# See also GPC section B.1.1.2, E.4.7, and E.4.1
cipher = DES3.new(self.sk.data_enc, DES.MODE_ECB)
cipher = DES.new(self.card_keys.dek[:8], DES.MODE_ECB)
return cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
def _compute_cryptograms(self, card_challenge: bytes, host_challenge: bytes):

View File

@@ -2200,9 +2200,9 @@ update_record 6 fe0112ffb53e96e5ff99731d51ad7beafd0e23ffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 7 fe02101da012f436d06824ecdd15050419ff9affffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 8 fe02116929a373388ac904aff57ff57f6b3431ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 9 fe0212a99245a5dc814e2f4c1aa908e9946e03ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 10 fe03601111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
update_record 11 fe03612222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
update_record 12 fe03623333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
update_record 10 fe0310521312c05a9aea93d70d44405172a580ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 11 fe0311a9e45c72d45abde7db74261ee0c11b1bffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
update_record 12 fe0312867ba36b5873d60ea8b2cdcf3c0ddddaffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
#
################################################################################
# MF/DF.SYSTEM/EF.SIM_AUTH_COUNTER #

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
},
{
"profile_info": {
"iccid": "8949449999999990031",
"iccid": "8949449999999990031f",
"isdp_aid": "a0000005591010ffffffff8900001200",
"profile_state": "disabled",
"service_provider_name": "OsmocomSPN",

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import os
import json
from utils import *
# This testcase requires a sysmoEUICC1-C2T with the test prfile TS48V1-B-UNIQUE (ICCID 8949449999999990031)
# This testcase requires a sysmoEUICC1-C2T with the test prfile TS48V1-B-UNIQUE (ICCID 8949449999999990031f)
# installed, and in disabled state. Also the profile must be installed in such a way that notifications are
# generated when the profile is disabled or enabled (ProfileMetadata)

View File

@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ select ADF.ISD-R
enable_profile --iccid 89000123456789012341
# Generate two (additional) notifications by quickly enabeling the test profile
enable_profile --iccid 8949449999999990031
enable_profile --iccid 8949449999999990031f
enable_profile --iccid 89000123456789012341

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# Card parameter:
ICCID="8949440000001155314"
KIC='51D4FC44BCBA7C4589DFADA3297720AF'
KID='0449699C472CE71E2FB7B56245EF7684'
# Testcase: Send OTA-SMS that selects DF.GSM and returns the select response
TAR='B00010'
APDU='A0A40000027F20A0C0000016'
EXPECTED_RESPONSE='0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000'

View File

@@ -20,14 +20,13 @@
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
PYSIM_SHELL=./pySim-shell.py
PYSIM_SHELL_LOG=./pySim-shell.log
PYSIM_SMPP2SIM=./pySim-smpp2sim.py
PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_LOG=./pySim-smpp2sim.log
PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PORT=2775
PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_TIMEOUT=10
PYSIM_SMPPOTATOOL=./contrib/smpp-ota-tool.py
PYSIM_SMPPOTATOOL_LOG=./smpp-ota-tool.log
PYSIM_SHELL=./pySim-shell.py
function dump_logs {
echo ""
@@ -45,11 +44,12 @@ function dump_logs {
function send_test_request {
echo ""
echo "Sending request to SMPP server:"
C_APDU=$1
R_APDU_EXPECTED=$2
TAR=$1
C_APDU=$2
R_APDU_EXPECTED=$3
echo "Sending: $C_APDU"
COMMANDLINE="$PYSIM_SMPPOTATOOL --verbose --port $PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PORT --kic $KIC --kid $KID --kic-idx $KEY_INDEX --kid-idx $KEY_INDEX --algo-crypt $ALGO_CRYPT --algo-auth $ALGO_AUTH --tar $TAR --apdu $C_APDU"
COMMANDLINE="$PYSIM_SMPPOTATOOL --verbose --port $PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PORT --kic $KIC --kid $KID --tar $TAR --apdu $C_APDU"
echo "Commandline: $COMMANDLINE"
R_APDU=`$COMMANDLINE 2> $PYSIM_SMPPOTATOOL_LOG`
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ function send_test_request {
dump_logs
exit 1
fi
echo ""
echo "Got response from SMPP server:"
echo "Sent: $C_APDU"
echo "Received: $R_APDU"
@@ -68,14 +68,16 @@ function send_test_request {
exit 1
fi
echo "Response matches the expected response -- success!"
echo ""
}
function start_smpp_server {
PCSC_READER=$1
# Start the SMPP server
echo ""
echo "Starting SMPP server:"
# Start the SMPP server
COMMANDLINE="$PYSIM_SMPP2SIM -p $PCSC_READER --smpp-bind-port $PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PORT --apdu-trace"
echo "Commandline: $COMMANDLINE"
$COMMANDLINE > $PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_LOG 2>&1 &
@@ -100,117 +102,55 @@ function start_smpp_server {
echo "SMPP server reachable (port=$PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PORT)"
}
function stop_smpp_server {
echo ""
echo "Stopping SMPP server:"
kill $PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PID
echo "SMPP server stopped (PID=$PYSIM_SMPP2SIM_PID)"
trap EXIT
}
function find_card_by_iccid_or_eid {
function find_card_by_iccid {
# Find reader number of the card
ICCID=$1
EID=$2
echo ""
echo "Searching for card:"
echo "ICCID: \"$ICCID\""
if [ -n "$EID" ]; then
echo "EID: \"$EID\""
fi
# Determine number of available PCSC readers
PCSC_READER_COUNT=`pcsc_scan -rn | wc -l`
# In case an EID is set, search for a card with that EID first
if [ -n "$EID" ]; then
for PCSC_READER in $(seq 0 $(($PCSC_READER_COUNT-1))); do
echo "probing card (eID) in reader $PCSC_READER ..."
RESULT_JSON=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e "select ADF.ISD-R" -e "get_eid" 2> /dev/null | tail -3`
echo $RESULT_JSON | grep $EID > /dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Found card (eID) in reader $PCSC_READER"
return $PCSC_READER
fi
done
fi
# Search for card with the given ICCID
if [ -z "$ICCID" ]; then
echo "invalid ICCID, zero length ICCID is not allowed! -- abort"
exit 1
fi
PCSC_READER_COUNT=`pcsc_scan -rn | wc -l`
for PCSC_READER in $(seq 0 $(($PCSC_READER_COUNT-1))); do
echo "probing card (ICCID) in reader $PCSC_READER ..."
RESULT_JSON=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e "select EF.ICCID" -e "read_binary_decoded" 2> /dev/null | tail -3`
echo $RESULT_JSON | grep $ICCID > /dev/null
echo "probing card in reader $PCSC_READER ..."
EF_ICCID_DECODED=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e 'select EF.ICCID' -e 'read_binary_decoded --oneline' 2> /dev/null | tail -1`
echo $EF_ICCID_DECODED | grep $ICCID > /dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Found card (by ICCID) in reader $PCSC_READER"
echo "Found card in reader $PCSC_READER"
return $PCSC_READER
fi
done
echo "Card not found -- abort"
echo "Card with ICCID \"$ICCID\" not found -- abort"
exit 1
}
function enable_profile {
PCSC_READER=$1
ICCID=$2
EID=$3
if [ -z "$EID" ]; then
# This is no eUICC, nothing to enable
return 0
fi
# Check if the profile is already enabled
RESULT_JSON=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e "select EF.ICCID" -e "read_binary_decoded" 2> /dev/null | tail -3`
ICCID_ENABLED=`echo $RESULT_JSON | jq -r '.iccid'`
if [ $ICCID != $ICCID_ENABLED ]; then
# Disable the currentle enabled profile
echo ""
echo "Disabeling currently enabled profile:"
echo "ICCID: \"$ICCID\""
RESULT_JSON=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e "select ADF.ISD-R" -e "disable_profile --iccid $ICCID_ENABLED" 2> /dev/null | tail -3`
echo $RESULT_JSON | grep "ok" > /dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "unable to disable profile with \"$ICCID_ENABLED\""
exit 1
fi
echo "profile disabled"
# Enable the profile we intend to test with
echo ""
echo "Enabeling profile:"
echo "ICCID: \"$ICCID\""
RESULT_JSON=`$PYSIM_SHELL -p $PCSC_READER --noprompt -e "select ADF.ISD-R" -e "enable_profile --iccid $ICCID" 2> /dev/null | tail -3`
echo $RESULT_JSON | grep "ok\|profileNotInDisabledState" > /dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "unable to enable profile with \"$ICCID\""
exit 1
fi
echo "profile enabled"
fi
}
export PYTHONPATH=./
echo "pySim-smpp2sim_test - a test program to test pySim-smpp2sim.py"
echo "=============================================================="
TESTCASE_DIR=`dirname $0`
for TEST_CONFIG_FILE in $TESTCASE_DIR/testcase_*.cfg ; do
echo ""
echo "running testcase: $TEST_CONFIG_FILE"
. $TEST_CONFIG_FILE
find_card_by_iccid_or_eid $ICCID $EID
PCSC_READER=$?
enable_profile $PCSC_READER $ICCID $EID
start_smpp_server $PCSC_READER
send_test_request $APDU "$EXPECTED_RESPONSE"
stop_smpp_server
echo ""
echo "testcase ok"
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------"
done
# TODO: At the moment we can only have one card and one testcase. This is
# sufficient for now. We can extend this later as needed.
# Read test parameters from config from file
TEST_CONFIG_FILE=${0%.*}.cfg
echo "using config file: $TEST_CONFIG_FILE"
if ! [ -e "$TEST_CONFIG_FILE" ]; then
echo "test configuration file does not exist! -- abort"
exit 1
fi
. $TEST_CONFIG_FILE
# Execute testcase
find_card_by_iccid $ICCID
start_smpp_server $?
send_test_request $TAR $APDU "$EXPECTED_RESPONSE"
echo "done."

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Preparation:
# This testcase executes against a sysmoISIM-SJA5 card. For the testcase, the
# key configuration on the card may be used as it is.
# Card parameter:
ICCID="8949440000001155314" # <-- change to the ICCID of your card!
EID=""
KIC='51D4FC44BCBA7C4589DFADA3297720AF' # <-- change to the KIC1 of your card!
KID='0449699C472CE71E2FB7B56245EF7684' # <-- change to the KID1 of your card!
KEY_INDEX=1
ALGO_CRYPT=triple_des_cbc2
ALGO_AUTH=triple_des_cbc2
TAR='B00010'
# Testcase: Send OTA-SMS that selects DF.GSM and returns the select response
APDU='A0A40000027F20A0C0000016'
EXPECTED_RESPONSE='0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000'

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Preparation:
# This testcase executes against a sysmoEUICC1-C2T, which is equipped with the
# TS48V1-B-UNIQUE test profile from https://test.rsp.sysmocom.de/ (Activation
# code: 1$smdpp.test.rsp.sysmocom.de$TS48V1-B-UNIQUE). This testprofile must be
# present on the eUICC before this testcase can be executed.
# Card parameter:
ICCID="8949449999999990031"
EID="89049044900000000000000000102355" # <-- change to the EID of your card!
KIC='66778899aabbccdd1122334455eeff10'
KID='112233445566778899aabbccddeeff10'
KEY_INDEX=2
ALGO_CRYPT=aes_cbc
ALGO_AUTH=aes_cmac
TAR='b00120'
# Testcase: Send OTA-SMS that selects DF.ICCID and returns the select response
APDU='00a40004022fe200C000001d'
EXPECTED_RESPONSE='621b8202412183022fe2a503d001408a01058b032f06038002000a8800 9000'

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# Preparation:
# This testcase executes against a sysmoISIM-SJA5 card. Since this card model is
# shipped with a classic DES key configuration, it is necessary to provision
# AES128 test keys before this testcase may be executed. The the following
# pySim-shell command sequence may be used:
#
# verify_adm 34173960 # <-- change to the ADM key of your card!
# select /DF.SYSTEM/EF.0348_KEY
# update_record 10 fe03601111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
# update_record 11 fe03612222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
# update_record 12 fe03623333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
#
# This overwrites one of the already existing 3DES SCP02 key (KVN 47) and replaces it
# with an AES256 SCP80 key (KVN 3).
# Card parameter:
ICCID="8949440000001155314" # <-- change to the ICCID of your card!
EID=""
KIC='1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111'
KID='2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222'
KEY_INDEX=3
ALGO_CRYPT=aes_cbc
ALGO_AUTH=aes_cmac
TAR='B00010'
# Testcase: Send OTA-SMS that selects DF.GSM and returns the select response
APDU='A0A40000027F20A0C0000016'
EXPECTED_RESPONSE='0000ffff7f2002000000000009b106350400838a838a 9000'