The probe is not a RAM operation, so it moves out of the RAM view into a third
SCP80 pill (Secured packet | RAM | TAR probe, RU "TAR-сканер"), with its own
preset and key-version selectors, its own equipped-card mismatch banner and its
own result line; the help gains a "3.3 TAR probe" section and the anchor map
follows the pill.
The TAR field is a checklist now: pre-populated with the standard allocations
of TS 101 220 V18.3.0 Annex D, Table D.1 (each row carrying the document it
comes from, all checked by default, Select all / Select none), plus custom
TARs added through a small form (three hex bytes + an optional description,
removed with a x). Custom entries live in localStorage['simple_tar_probe'] on
a best-effort basis - losing them is harmless, the standard list is always
there. Only the checked TARs are sent; nothing checked is refused with a
message. A Python test guards the PWA's list against the server's
TAR_PROBE_TARS (the endpoint keeps its own default for API callers).
RAM leftovers removed (the tar-probe operation entry, the #ram-tar-rows block,
the ramExecute dispatch, ramTarProbe); getRamSpParams() takes the view's
selector id; tarRender/tarApplyCard/tarKeysetChanged/tarKeysetGuard mirror the
RAM view; spKeysetSync and spPresetWarningRender cover the new selectors.
sw cache simple-v338. Tests: 740 Node (the checklist rows, the custom
round-trip, the checked-list read, the renderer, the pill wiring) and 619
Python (the list drift guard).
Three things learned from probing a live card, plus the capability they enabled:
1. Counter tracking follows SPI1.b5b4 (TS 102 225 5.1.1): with 00 the counter
is "present, ignored, never updated", so a packet without a counter check
must leave every counter untouched. _counter_tracked() now guards
/api/send-ota (no final_cntr, no persistence, a log line), the RAM step
sender and the test runner; _preset_counter_persist() requires a non-zero
key version (the "single keyset" fallback could advance a keyset spuriously
for a keyless send). The PWA advances the form counter only when the server
reports final_cntr and says "counter not tracked" otherwise.
2. The spec's no-security form builds again: _ota_keyset() refused the valid
KIc/KID '00' (TS 102 225 A.2: '00' is legal with SPI1.b3=0 for KIc and
SPI1.b2b1=00 for KID) because pySim wants an algorithm. An unknown nibble
is now refused only when the algorithm is actually used (ciphering / a
ciphered PoR for KIc, RC/CC/DS / a MAC'd PoR for KID) and 'implicit' codes
the nibble as 0 otherwise - POST /api/send-ota {apdu, spi1:"00", kic:"00",
kid:"00"} now builds 0D00010000B0000000000000010000A40000, the exact packet
the card accepted (a fake 15/15 was refused with 6200). A no-security PoR
is decodable again too, and a requested-but-missing PoR sets por_missing
on the plain path as well.
3. TAR probe (POST /api/tar-probe, RAM op "Probe TARs"): one secured packet per
TAR - the standard allocations of TS 101 220 V18.3.0 Annex D, Table D.1
(TAR_PROBE_TARS), or a custom list - carrying a harmless C-APDU (SELECT MF)
with the preset's keyset and SPI 16/01. Each TAR is classified
(registered / no_answer / no_por / refused) from the ENVELOPE verdict and
the application's PoR, counters advance and persist normally, and the run is
refused when SPI1 has no counter check. Live on a card: 000000, B00000 and
B00001 registered (compact-format applications, answering 6D00 / 6B00),
the expanded-format TARs, USAT, multiplexing and CASD refused with 6200 -
with the keyless form the same card accepted every TAR and answered no PoR.
Docs (api.md, help EN/RU, AGENTS), sw cache simple-v337. Tests: 618 Python
(no-security build, the algorithm-only-when-used rule, the tracking rule, the
persist guard, the probe classification) and 736 Node (the probe renderer and
wiring, spCounterTracked).
catarrh